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Philosophical Enquiries into the Science of Sensibility: 
An Introductory Essay 
 
Koen Vermeir and Michael Funk Deckard 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Burke and the writing of the Philosophical Enquiry 
Edmund Burke (1730-1797) was 23 years old when he finished writing the Philosophical 
Enquiry, as he attests to in the introduction to the 1757 edition.29 A major work in the history 
of criticism (or what we would now call aesthetics), the topic of the book had long been 
present in Burke’s mind. From his early years in college (1743-1748), Burke was fascinated 
by literature, poetry, and art. Sneaking away when possible, spending much of his free time 
reading literature and history in the public library, Burke was not much engaged in his formal 
studies at Trinity College, Dublin, but aspired to become a poet.30 Burke was immersed from 
early on in literary pursuits. He co-founded a debating club and a periodical, and he wrote 
poems, satires and newspaper articles. His interest in art theory is also clear from a letter he 
wrote when he was 14 years old. In this letter, he comments favourably on a Hutchesonian 
view of ‘beauty’ as consisting in variety and uniformity, exemplified in the motion of the 
heavenly bodies.31 
In the ten years or so that Burke formed and gestated his ideas on the beautiful and the 
sublime, he would draw on various sources. In addition to Burke’s classical studies from 
Aristotle to Virgil, Horace and Cicero,32 an early inspiration from his college years was the 
Greek treatise Peri Hupsous [On the Sublime], attributed to Longinus, which he shared 
enthusiastically with his friends.33 From 1750, a new world opened up to Burke, when he 
travelled to England to study law. He still did not apply himself to his studies 
wholeheartedly, and his interests were deflected to literary topics, soaking up the London 
intellectual milieu. At first, the change disagreed with Burke. For two years, till 1752, Burke 
suffered from psychosomatic ailments, which he attributed to his sensibility and too much 
study. Probably, it was rather due to his inability to apply himself to his studies and to make a 
firm choice as regards his future. He travelled to resorts to alleviate his sufferings, and it was 
at the fashionable resort of Bath that he met Christopher Nugent, who would become a major 
influence in his life.  
Nugent was a physician and Burke initially came to him for a cure of his illness. Burke 
was very much impressed with Nugent’s character, however, and the latter became the guide, 
friend and surrogate father figure that Burke needed. Burke had been interested in medicine 
from early on. In 1745, for instance, he had attended a course of public lectures by the oculist 
John Taylor. Although Burke considered Taylor an errant quack, Burke’s biographer Fred 
Lock speculates that these lectures could have started him thinking about the physiology of 
perception, and about the experiences of the blind, which provided important evidence for his 
                                                 
29 For biographies of Burke in the 1750s, see esp. F.P. Lock’s recent biography, Edmund Burke, vol. 1 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) and Dixon Wecter, ‘The missing years in Edmund Burke’s Biography’, 
Publications of the Modern Library Association, 53 (1938), 1102–1125. See also Elizabeth R. Lambert, 
Edmund Burke of Beaconsfield (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2003). 
30 As Paddy Bullard notes, the Philosophical Enquiry can be seen as a book born of much reading in 
English poetry. See Chapter 12 of this volume. 
31 Lock, ibid., Ch 2-4, esp. p. 94. 
32 See Chapter 8 below by Richard Bourke. 
33 In Chapter 11 of this volume, Cressida Ryan explores Burke’s use of Longinus in the Enquiry. 
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theory developed in the Philosophical Enquiry.34 Becoming more and more involved with 
Nugent on a personal level, Burke was also engaged in Nugent’s scientific speculations. 
Among the rare information from this time of Burke’s life, there is a telling anecdote of 
Burke publicly engaging in conversation with a local physician from Bath, and ‘displaying so 
much knowledge in that science, as surprised the professor of it’.35 Nugent espoused a new 
theory of the nervous system as well as radical ideas about drastic therapy, aiming to 
overpower the spasms of the distressed body by superior forces of a stronger but less 
dangerous kind. Traces of some of these ideas, developed during the early years of their 
acquaintance and published in Nugent’s Essay on the Hydrophobia (1753), can be found in 
the detailed physiological descriptions in the Enquiry. As Aris Sarafianos has pointed out, 
Burke’s ‘maximalist’ ideas about the physical benefits of the sublime also seem to mirror 
Nugent’s drastic medical therapies.36 
After two years, no doubt thanks to the care of Nugent and his family, Burke’s 
listlessness and inability to concentrate had disappeared. He had also taken up his pen again. 
During the long summer recesses away from London, Burke would write journalistic essays 
in his notebook. He also wrote his first book, A Vindication of Natural Society, which was a 
satire of Bolingbroke’s deism, published in 1756. In the summer of 1756, he wrote the 
Account of the European Settlements in America (1757) together with William Burke. Most 
importantly, during one of the previous summers, he had penned the Philosophical Enquiry. 
In the meantime, Burke had fallen in love with Nugent’s daughter, Jane. Burke’s engagement 
with the Nugent’s and his literary work were intertwined at the time. Written in the early 
stages of his courtship with Jane, the passages describing the physiology of love in the 
Enquiry probably derived directly from his personal experience.37 Both life-changing projects 
would come to fruition at the same time. Less than a month after Burke’s marriage with Jane 
Nugent, the book that would establish his reputation in the literary world appeared. 
One of Burke’s reasons to stress that he had finished writing the Enquiry in 1753, four 
years before its publication, was to affirm his independence from three other works that had 
appeared in the meantime: William Hogarth’s Analysis of Beauty, Written with a View of 
Fixing the Fluctuating Ideas of Taste (1753), John Gilbert Cooper’s Letters Concerning 
Taste (1755) and Étienne Bonnet de Condillac’s Traité des sensations (1754). Burke’s 
Philosophical Enquiry was part of a flurry of writings on beauty and taste. A few years 
before the Enquiry, Condillac had also written the Recherches sur l’origine des idées que 
nous avons de la beauté (1749). Furthermore, Abbé J.-B. Du Bos’ Réflexions critiques sur la 
poésie et la peinture (1719) was translated into English by Thomas Nugent, a close relative 
of Christopher Nugent, in 1748 as Critical Reflections on Poetry, Painting and Music With 
an Inquiry into the Rise and Progress of the Theatrical Entertainments of the Ancients.38  
In the same year as Burke’s Enquiry, David Hume’s ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ was 
published as one of his Four Dissertations.39 Around the same time a competition was 
                                                 
34 Lock, ibid., 91. 
35 Cited in Aris Sarafianos, ‘The Contractility of Burke’s Sublime and Heterodoxies in Medicine and Art’, 
Journal of the History of Ideas, 69.1 (January 2008), 23–48, p. 29. Sarafianos has argued that through Nugent, 
Burke became engrossed in a ‘heterodox’ milieu of medical science. 
36 See Sarafianos, ibid., 31. See also Sarafianos ‘Pain, Labour and the Sublime: Medical Gymnastics and 
Burke’s Aesthetics’, Representations, 91 (Summer 2005), 58–83. 
37 See Lock, ibid., 88-90. 
38 Some of Condillac’s and Montesquieu’s work would also be translated by Thomas Nugent, e.g. An 
Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge (London, 1756) and Spirit of Laws (London, 1752) respectively. 
Thomas Nugent had honoured Christopher Nugent in his will (See C. P. Courtney, Montesquieu and Burke, 
Oxford, 1963, p. 5).  
39 David Hume, Four Dissertations. I. The Natural History of Religion. II. Of the Passions. III. Of 
Tragedy. IV. Of the Standard of Taste (London: A. Millar, 1757). For a discussion of the publication of this 
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proposed by The Select Society of Edinburgh for the best essay on taste, which was won by 
Alexander Gerard’s Essay on taste, published in 1759.40 Burke himself would add a new 
introduction on taste to the 1759 edition of the Philosophical Enquiry.41 To the same flood of 
writings on beauty, taste and sensibility, we might also count Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral 
Sentiments (1759) and his lectures on rhetoric, delivered during the winter of 1748–49, which 
were not published at the time but were very influential.42 Joseph Priestley also gave a course 
on criticism in 1759, A Course of Lectures on Oratory and Criticism (published only in 
1777), based on the associationist philosophy of David Hartley’s Observations on Man 
(1749). As a last contribution, Henry Home’s (Lord Kames) Elements of Criticism (1762) 
should be mentioned. 
As will be clear from this list of texts, Burke’s Philosophical Enquiry was part of a real 
historical development of critical writings about art and literature as well as the social 
embedding of affect. In a period of around ten years, more than ten major and original 
contributions on ‘aesthetics’ had been published by some of the most prominent authors of 
the time. This indicates that the question of taste and aesthetics had become crucial to mid-
eighteenth century culture. Indeed, the concept of sensibility permeated all aspects of cultural 
life at the time, and this era has aptly been referred to as pervaded by a ‘culture of 
sensibility’. ‘Sensibility’ was the central concept in questions of morality, art, epistemology, 
medicine, biology, and in questions relating to gender inequality, manners, social and 
economic structures as well as political positions. As aesthetics was not limited to art 
criticism in the eighteenth century, but was understood in its broad sense as a ‘science of 
sensitive cognition’ or a ‘science of sensibility’ (referring to the original Greek aesthesis: 
what concerns the senses, sensibility), it assumed sudden importance.43 Because of the 
increasing cultural prominence of the concept of sensibility, ‘aesthetics’ and related issues of 
taste and criticism were propelled to centre-stage and made into one of the most prominent 
fields of intellectual life and philosophy, thus becoming a place for heated debate where 
religious, scientific, political, social and philosophical disagreements could be discussed and 
fought over. 
In this introductory essay, we will elucidate the different aspects of what can be called 
the ‘science of sensibility’ as a framework to understand Edmund Burke’s Philosophical 
Enquiry. As such, it is partly independent of the different essays collected in this book, which 
                                                                                                                                                       
work, see David Hume, A Dissertation on the Passions; The Natural History of Religion: A Critical Edition, 
Tom L. Beauchamp (ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), introduction. 
40 Alexander Gerard, An Essay on Taste (London: Printed for A. Millar in the Strand, A. Kincaid and J. 
Bell, in Edinburgh, 1759). 
41 Besides small changes here and there, the only other significant addition was the section on ‘Power’ 
(II.v) imitating John Locke’s own addition to the 2nd edition of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding of 
a section entitled ‘On Power’. 
42 Adam Smith, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, eds. J.C. Bryce and A.S. Skinner (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1983). See also Robert Crawford in Devolving English Literature, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2000), pp. 27–36. 
43 The definition of aesthetics as a ‘science of sensitive cognition’ is from Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, 
Aesthetica (Frankfurt a.O., 1750), §1. In 1735, when Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten introduced for the first 
time aesthetics as a subject in academic philosophy, he characterised it as ‘a science of how things are to be 
known by means of the senses’ (scientiam sensitive quid cognoscendi). See Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, 
Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus. Philosophische Betrachtunglen über einige 
Bedingungen des Gedichtes, Heinz Paetzold (ed.) (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1983), §cxv-cxvi. It should be noted 
that ‘sensibility’ was not limited to just a physiological susceptibility but included delicate emotional responses 
as well as rational opinion and judgement, and this combination of physiological, emotional and rational 
elements is reflected in the meaning of ‘aesthetics’. For the complex meaning of ‘sensibility’, see our discussion 
in the next section. See also Paul Guyer, ‘The Origins of Modern Aesthetics: 1711-1735’ in Peter Kivy (ed.), 
The Blackwell guide to aesthetics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), pp. 15-44, for the origins of aesthetics interpreted 
(somewhat anachronistically) from a Kantian perspective. 
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focus on other aspects of the Philosophical Enquiry. On the other hand, this essay also 
functions as a true introduction to the volume, because it explores the potential of one 
particular perspective (‘sensibility’) to integrate different kinds of analyses of Burke’s work. 
Indeed, the concept of sensibility permeated a vast array of different areas of mid eighteenth-
century culture (which can therefore be aptly called a ‘culture of sensibility’) and can provide 
us with a transdisciplinary and integrative perspective. The three parts of this text will deal 
with the most prominent aspects of a science of sensibility: the basis of the science of 
sensibility in physiological theory, the science of morals (in the inclusive sense, incorporating 
manners and social interaction) and the burgeoning science of aesthetics as such. These 
different aspects of sensibility can hardly be separated and were constantly discussed 
together. This reveals that there will be recurring themes and that we will have to tackle 
similar problems in each section. One of these guiding threads is the relation between reason 
and feeling, judgement and instinct, and in what degree these opposites participate in 
‘sensibility’. A second recurring point of discussion will be the variability versus the 
universality of moral and aesthetic sensibilities. Taken together, these two problems form the 
background against which much of eighteenth-century intellectual discussion evolved. In 
particular, they are also two key questions that Burke addresses in his Philosophical Enquiry. 
 
 
PART 1: Science and sensibility 
 
The culture of sensibility 
Sensibility appears, quite suddenly, as a central notion in the first half of the eighteenth 
century. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the word is rarely used before that 
time. When used, the word had referred solely to the physiological power of sensation or 
perception, as exemplified in the sensory organs. Later, it also came to stand for the 
sensitiveness of these organs. In his A Dictionary of the English Language (1755), Samuel 
Johnson defined sensibility as ‘1. Quickness of sensation. 2. Quickness of perception; 
delicacy,’44 still reflecting the physiological bias of the word. Joseph Addison, however, had 
used the word already for a delicate emotional as well as physical susceptibility in 1711. 
Writing about modesty, he referred to an exquisite sensibility and a kind of quick and delicate 
feeling in the soul.45 Emotional and bodily states were more and more seen as inextricably 
connected. Sensibility came to stand for a disposition of being easily and strongly affected—
physiologically as well as psychologically—by emotional influences. First applied to 
physical sensation, in the mid eighteenth century, sensibility became the refinement of 
passionate responses, delicate sensitiveness of taste and sympathy for suffering.46 This 
                                                 
44 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (London, 1755).  I have used the 1785 edition. 
45 Addison, Spectator, No. 231 (Saturday, November 24, 1711). 
46 On the culture of sensibility, see Janet Todd, Sensibility: An Introduction (New York: Methuen, 1986); 
John Mullan, Sentiment and Sociability: The Language of Feeling in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1988); G. J. Barker-Benfield, The Culture of Sensibility: Sex and Society in Eighteenth-
Century Britain (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); R. F. Brissenden, Virtue in Distress: Studies in 
the Novel of Sentiment from Richardson to Sade. New York: Harper & Row 1974; Sydney McMillen Conger. 
Sensibility in Transformation: Creative Resistance to Sentiment from the Augustans to the Romantics (London: 
Associated University Press, 1990). F. Hilles and H. Bloom (eds.), From Sensibility to Romanticism (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1965). Northrop Frye, ‘Towards Defining an Age of Sensibility’ English 
Literary History, 23 (1956), 144–152; Northrop Frye, ‘Varieties of Eighteenth-Century Sensibility’, in Robert 
Denham (ed.), Northrop Frye: The Eternal Act of Creation. Essays, 1979-1990 (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1993), pp. 94-108; Louis Bredvold, Natural History of Sensibility (Detroit: Wayne State 
University Press, 1962); Edith Birkhead, ‘Sentiment and Sensibility in the Eighteenth-Century Novel’, in Oliver 
Elton (ed.), Essays and Studies by Members of the English Association (32 vols.) (London, Dawson, 1966), 11, 
92–116.  
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susceptibility thus had to be transformed through refinement and not just through rational 
thinking. Some treated this sensibility as positive, while others saw it as a weakness.  
The concept of sensibility was part of a group of cognate words derived from ‘sense’, 
such as ‘sensitive’, ‘sensible’, ‘sentiment’ and ‘sentimental’ (all stemming of sentire: to 
perceive, to feel). All these words had a primary meaning related to the physiology of 
perception. ‘Sensitive’ is ‘having the function of sensation or sensuous perception’, ‘sensible’ 
meant ‘perceptible by the senses, pertaining to the senses or sensation’, ‘sentiment’ meant 
‘sensation, physical feeling’ and ‘sentimental’ stood for ‘characterised by sentiment’. In the 
course of the eighteenth century, these words took on meanings and qualifications unique to 
the period, and thereby gained enriched connotations and refined meanings. ‘Sensitive’ was 
used with added meanings such as ‘capable of feeling’ in the mid-eighteenth century, and 
later, up to the nineteenth century, it came to refer to ‘having quick and acute sensibilities’. 
Similarly, ‘sensible’ came to mean ‘having sensibility; capable of delicate or tender feeling.’ 
A sensible man was someone performing charitable acts, from the sensibility of the feeling 
heart. ‘Sentiment’ stood for ‘exhibiting refined and elevated feeling’ and the word 
‘sentimental’ was originally only used in a favourable sense.47 
Notwithstanding the prominence of the emotions, mid eighteenth-century sensibility was 
not necessarily seen as irrational, as long as this sensibility did not become ‘enthusiasm’.48 
Sensibility incorporated both knowledge and passion and stood for a quickness of feeling as 
well as for an acuteness of apprehension. ‘Sensible’ could also mean intelligent, reasonable 
and judicious,49 and ‘sentiment’ involved an intellectual element. A sentiment was a moral 
reflection, a rational opinion on morals that was also influenced by emotion. It should not 
then surprise us that sensibility also included a rational element, because the intellectual 
outlook in the eighteenth century was strongly imbued with Lockean sensationalism. 
Searching for the limits of knowledge, Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding 
concluded that intuitive or demonstrative knowledge is impossible. The only possible kind of 
knowledge is ‘sensitive knowledge’, knowledge of what comes ‘every day within the notice 
                                                 
47 See ‘sensibility’ and its cognates in Johnson, ibid.; Encyclopaedia  Britannica, 1797 ed,; Oxford English 
Dictionary; Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society, rev. ed. (New York: Oxford 
UP, 1983), pp. 280–83. See also the references in the note above.  
48 In the period of the English Civil War and the following decades, enthusiasm was disparaged and 
deemed dangerous. Often used for unorthodox religious beliefs and behaviour, the term referred more generally 
to actions resulting from an overheated imagination and uncontrolled passions. Interestingly, enthusiasm was 
caused by the same physiological and mental disorders that would later become associated with the ‘sensibility’ 
promoted in the eighteenth century. As a result, enthusiasm had to be rethought as based on basically sound 
affections and a delicate responsiveness, rooted in human nature. This change went hand in hand with the 
rehabilitation of the affections as a foundation of moral agency and aesthetic perception. Shaftesbury was 
particularly instrumental in this revaluation of enthusiasm as sensibility. Of course, excessive enthusiasm or 
excessive sensibility still had to be rejected. Two types of enthusiasm were distinguished: in The Moralists, for 
instance, Shaftesbury contrasted a savage, vulgar, fierce and unsociable enthusiasm with a serene, soft, 
harmonious, public and poetic enthusiasm. See Shaftesbury, The Moralists, in Shaftesbury, Characteristics of 
Men, Manners, Opinions, Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 246. See also Susie I. Tucker, 
Enthusiasm: A Study of Semantic Change (Cambridge, 1972); Lawrence Klein, ‘Shaftesbury, politeness and the 
politics of religion’, in Nicholas Phillipson and Quentin Skinner (eds.), Political discourse in early modern 
Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 283–301; M. Heyd, “Be Sober and Reasonable”. The 
Critique of Enthusiasm in the Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Century (Leiden: Brill, 1995), esp. 224. On 
Burke and enthusiasm, see J. G. A. Pocock, 'Edmund Burke and the Redefinition of Enthusiasm: The Context as 
Counter-Revolution' and 'Comment, or Piece Retrospective', in François Furet and Mona Ozouf (eds.), The 
French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture, vol. 3: The Transformation of Political 
Culture, 1789-1848 (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1989), pp. 19–36, 36–43. 
49 Note, however, that this use was still stigmatized by Johnson in 1755 as used only ‘in low conversation’. 
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of our Senses’.50 Everything we know, according to Locke, derives from what the senses tell 
us, i.e. from our sensibility. Emotive as well as rational responses are therefore rooted in 
human sensibility, and, eventually, in the human psychological and physiological makeup. 
Following Locke, philosophers recognised that both ‘sense’ and ‘sensibility’ derived from the 
sense organs. This sensationalism, in which all feeling and thought were reducible to original 
sense perceptions, constituted the philosophical framework of the eighteenth century, on 
which scientific, religious, moral and artistic developments were grafted.  
 
Science, medicine and sensibility51 
John Locke had systematised sensationalist psychology by his denial of the existence of 
innate ideas. For Locke, experience is of two kinds: sensation, which gives us information 
about the external world and reflection, which is a sort of internal sensation that makes us 
conscious of our own mental processes. Locke then developed the general psychological 
machinery of how simple and complex ideas are derived from sensation and reflection. 
Eighteenth-century physicians and natural philosophers drew on work by Thomas Willis, 
Isaac Newton, as well as on older traditions, to develop Locke’s psychology and detail its 
physiological underpinnings.52  
Thomas Willis was Locke’s tutor at Oxford at the time that the former was 
revolutionizing theories of the brain and the nervous system. Willis revised the classical 
Galenic system as well as the more recent developments by Descartes and Steno. According 
to Galen, a vital spirit was transported by the blood, passed through the ventricles and fine 
blood vessels of the brain where it was rarefied and combined with air to yield the animal 
spirit. This animal spirit, which consists of the most subtle matter, is then transported through 
the nerves to the senses and muscles, performing the functions of what we now call the 
‘nervous system’. The essence of this scheme was unchallenged for centuries and still 
                                                 
50 J. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, P. H. Nidditch (ed.) (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1975 [1690]), IV.iii.29, pp. 559–560. 
51 It should be noted that ‘science’ in the early modern period only fits awkwardly with what we know as 
twenty-first century ‘science’. In the seventeenth century, what we would now call science was dispersed over 
mathematics, mixed mathematics, natural philosophy, natural history, medicine and even natural magic and 
alchemy. On the one hand, due to the influence of Newton, scientific aspiration and a form of ‘scientism’ (still 
pursued by ‘philosophes’ and not by professional scientists) can be recognised in many intellectual pursuits in 
the eighteenth century. On the other hand, science had also a broader, more general meaning of organised 
knowledge. Hence the idea of a ‘science of man’, which could include moral philosophy, aesthetics, the study of 
society and jurisprudence; hence also Baumgarten’s view of aesthetics as a ‘science of sensitive cognition’. On 
the eighteenth-century programme of a moral science, see Robert Brown, ‘Social Sciences’, in Knud 
Haakonssen (ed.), Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008), pp. 1069–1106.  
52 On medicine and sensibility, see George S. Rousseau, Nervous Acts. Essays on Literature, Culture and 
Sensibility (New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2004); George S. Rousseau (ed.), The Languages of Psyche: Mind 
and Body in Enlightenment Thought (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Ann Jessie Van Sant, 
Eighteenth-Century Sensibility and the Novel: The Senses in Social Context (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1993). 
Theodore Brown, ‘From mechanism to vitalism in eighteenth-century English physiology’, Journal of the 
History of Biology, 7 (1974), 179–216; Karl Figlio, ‘Theories of Perception and the Physiology of Mind in the 
Late Eighteenth Century’, History of Science, 13 (1975), 177–212; Elizabeth Haigh, ‘Vitalism, the Soul, and 
Sensibility: The Physiology of Théophile Bordeu’, Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences, 31 
(1976), 30–41; Christopher Lawrence, ‘The Nervous System and Society in the Scottish Enlightenment’, in 
Barry Barnes and Steven Shapin (eds.), Natural Order: Historical Studies of Scientific Culture (London: Sage, 
1979), 19–49; John Mullan, ‘Hypochondria and hysteria: sensibility and the physicians’, The Eighteenth 
Century, 25 (1983), 141-174; Hubert Steinke, Irritating Experiments: Haller's Concept and the European 
Controversy on Irritability and Sensibility, 1750-90. Clio Medica, 75 (New York: Rodopi, 2005); for the French 
context, see Jessica Riskin, Science in the Age of Sensibility (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002). 
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dominated medical and philosophical thought in the seventeenth century.53 René Descartes 
proposed a revised theoretical model in 1632. He developed a mechanical or hydrodynamic 
model of how the animal spirits are transported to the muscles by means of tubes, valves, and 
pumps, and how little threads, coming from the senses, open little tubes, so that as a result the 
freed animal spirits are projected onto the surface of a gland in the middle of the brain.54  
Willis criticised this Cartesian model. He wrote about the pineal gland that ‘we can 
scarce believe this to be the seat of the Soul, or its chief Faculties to arise from it; because 
Animals, which seem to be almost quite destitute of Imagination, Memory, and other superior 
Powers of the Soul, have this Glandula or Kernel large and fair enough’.55 Willis accepted 
the ventricular model of the brain, but he followed Gassendi in localizing the sensory and 
cognitive functions in the brain substance instead of in the ventricles. Willis made a 
distinction between the corporeal soul, the vital and sensitive part common to all animals, and 
the rational soul, the immaterial and immortal part that only man possessed. According to 
Willis, the interaction between the material part of man and his rational soul took place in the 
middle part of the brain, where the imagination, a part of the material soul, was placed: ‘we 
may affirm, this purely Spiritual [Rational Soul], to fit as in its Throne, in the principle part 
or Faculty of [the Corporeal Soul], to wit, in the Imagination, made out of a handful of 
Animal Spirits, most highly subtil, and seated in the Middle or Marrowie part of the Brain.’56 
Willis’ work would move neurological research away from the ventricles for the first time in 
more than a thousand years, and drew attention to the substance of the brain and the nerves. 
From Thomas Hobbes, who claimed that thought is a form of motion in the matter of the 
brain and nerves, to Locke, there had already been a growing interest in nerve functions by 
philosophers, in order to discover the underlying physical substratum of sensations, passions 
and thought, not to mention politics and religion.57 Furthermore, many physicians acquired a 
reputation of materialism – called by Sir Thomas Browne ‘the general scandal of my 
profession’ – because of their focus on the material part of man.58 Willis’ detailed anatomical 
descriptions in his Cerebri anatomi (1664) were followed by a neuropathology and 
neurophysiology of the brain in his Pathologicae cerebri, et nervosi generis specimen (1667) 
focussing on the behavioural and psychical disorders that resulted from a pathological 
sensibility and defective nervous system. Seventeenth-century empiricist and sensationalist 
philosophy, as well as progress in the description of neurology and the nerve system, spurred 
an interest in the physiology of sensibility in the early eighteenth century. 
The science of sensibility gathered speed when Isaac Newton published his theories of 
perception as part of his Opticks (1704), with the sections on sensation amplified in the 
                                                 
53 For the history of psychology and the anatomy of the brain, see Katharine Park, The Imagination in 
Renaissance Psychology (MPhil. Dissertation, Univ. London, 1974). E. R. Harvey, The Inwards Wits. 
Psychological Theory in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance (London: The Warburg Institute, 1975). For 
more on pneuma and spirit, see G. Verbeke, L’évolution de la doctrine du pneuma, du stoïcisme à Saint 
Augustin (Louvain: Desclée de Brouwer, 1945); M. Putscher, Pneuma, Spiritus, Geist. Vorstellungen vom 
Lebensantrieb in ihren geschichtlichen Wandlungen (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1974). See also L. 
Spruit, Species Intelligibilis. From Perception to Knowledge, Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History, 48 (Leiden: 
Brill, 1994). 
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second edition of 1717-18.59 Newton described how the optic nerves meet before they enter 
the brain, and how the fibres on the right side and those on the left side united, ‘and these two 
Nerves meeting in the Brain in such a manner that their Fibres make but one entire Species or 
Picture.’ Because of this merging of nerves before the brain, the two pictures that are brought 
together in the Sensorium can form a whole, one part coming from the right side of both eyes 
and the other part from the left side of both eyes.60 Newton rejected the older ideas about 
species, still accepted by Willis. After doing experiments, Newton concluded that he could 
not find the elusive animal spirits and developed a theory of nerve tensions and vibrations to 
explain sensibility. He explained vision, for instance, by the vibrations induced in the retina 
by the entering light, which were transmitted along the optic nerve. Earlier, William Briggs 
had also described the nerves as solid fibers. A mechanistic principle involving tension 
applied to the individual nerve fibres, ‘like unisons in a Lute.’ Only when the tension was 
equal in the two sets of fibres did single vision occur.61 These developments contributed to 
the variety in terminology, introducing fibres and nerves, vibrations and tensions, flows of 
subtle vapours and animal spirits, in the discussion of sensibility. Willis and Newton’s views 
were spread by the Dutch natural philosopher, Herman Boerhaave, whose teachings were 
widely influential. Boerhaave’s students, such as the members of the Monro family (they 
held the chair of anatomy in Edinburgh for 127 years, between 1719 and 1846), provided 
medical education to the protagonists of the Scottish Enlightenment, whose views would be 
central to the culture of sensibility.62  
Fashionable physicians successful in finding patronage often worked on the spleen, 
hysteria or hypochondria and they helped to popularize the nervous discourse.63 Nerves and 
sensibilities would really enter the popular mind with George Cheyne’s English Malady, or a 
Treatise on Nervous Diseases of all kinds, as Spleen, Vapours, Lowness of Spirits, 
Hypochondriacal and hysterical Distempers (1733), a book on nervous diseases targeted at 
the general reader. Dr Cheyne was eminently the physician of ‘nervous distempers’. He had 
studied medicine at Edinburgh and followed Willis and the Edinburgh school in 
characterising a whole series of diseases (spleen, vapours, flatus, hypochondria, hysteria, 
melancholy) as ‘nervous’. As a iatro-mechanist and Newtonian, Cheyne argued that ‘the 
animal functions depended upon the ready, free and painless operation of the nerves in 
expanding and contracting, or growing tense or relaxed, so as to communicate sensation and 
active motion.’64 By the middle of the eighteenth century, the Boerhavian view of the body as 
a complicated machine had been replaced by theories of the nervous system.65 These changes 
went hand in hand with the rise of the culture of sensibility. Cheyne compared the nerves to 
musical strings, which could vibrate with the proper pitch and convey signals in this way. 
The optimal sensibility of the body was characterised by a firm fibre tone.  
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Cheyne characterised what he called the ‘English malady’ as a disease of life-style and 
civilisation. Not only natural causes, such as atmospheric conditions, were at the roots of this 
disease, but also historical, cultural and social factors played a role. In the vein of Scottish 
Enlightenment historiography, Cheyne described the evolution of society from rude to 
civilised.66 People in civilised nations were more refined, had higher moral standards and had 
an increased sensibility. At the same time, sensibility was at the basis of sympathy, 
sociability and society itself. Too much refinement and delicacy, however, lead to weakness 
of the nerves, and civilization would in the end beget sickness and be ruptured. Society itself 
was becoming ‘nervous’. Sensibility and nervous disorders were inherently ambiguous. On 
the one hand, classical models of melancholy as the disorder of the learned, isolated from the 
bustle of every day life, still existed. These models were still useful in stressing the 
melancholic as a subtle and exceptional character. On the other hand, someone suffering 
from a nerve disease could be considered too much taken up in society, his sensibilities being 
refined to the extreme in the age of politeness and civility. His heightened sensibility might 
be too easily struck by the passions and emotions engendered in sociable interaction. The 
refinement of sensibility celebrated here did not refer to the deep meditations of the isolated 
scholar but to the civilized sociability of the gentleman. This made hypochondria much more 
popular – suddenly everyone seemed to suffer from some kind of nerve disease – and these 
explanations led to a kind of hysteria in which everyone seemed to believe they suffered from 
it.  
Increasingly, diseases such as hysteria or hypochondria were not seen as diseases of the 
imagination anymore, because that would render these diseases empirically unintelligible. 
Now, these diseases were seen as the result of physiological disorders, which could be 
studied with the Newtonian method. Sensibility was studied in a particular sensationalist and 
materialist vein. Because the causes of the disease were neurological, Cheyne believed that 
the remedies could be physiological. His favourite remedy consisted of milk diets and mild 
purges. Cheyne’s own medical biography confirms that – contrary to his puritan forefathers – 
he did not consider a tormented soul as the source of his problems, but a tormented body, for 
which he sought physical remedies, plagued him.67 While his view may have oversimplified 
medicine, it left its trace on later eighteenth-century thinkers, even if they were reacting or 
disagreeing to its overtly materialist explanations. 
Cheyne was an eminent figure in sciences and letters. He counted among his friends 
Samuel Johnson, Alexander Pope and David Hume. Unsurprisingly, all these authors have 
had their bouts of sensibilious melancholy or hypochondria. Boswell describes how Johnson 
was ‘overwhelmed with an horrible hypochondria’, which he ascribed to ‘what the learned, 
philosophical, and pious Dr Cheyne has so well treated under the title of “The English 
Malady”’ (from which Boswell too was suffering). Boswell went on to ascertain that 
‘Though [Johnson] suffered severely from it, he was not therefore degraded’ because this 
disease visited men ‘of genius and understanding in a degree far above the ordinary state of 
human nature.’68 Hume too saw himself as suffering from ‘the Vapours’ and ‘the Disease of 
the Learned’ caused by his ‘profound reflections’ when he was only twenty-two years old. In 
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the final section of Book 1 of his Treatise he famously describes how he is struck by 
melancholy when he realises ‘the sudden view of my danger’ to which his philosophising 
leads. He reflects on how his philosophy makes him in some ‘strange uncouth monster’ 
expelled by society, and on how he contracted philosophical melancholy, delirium and 
chimeras because his ‘wandering in such dreary solitudes’.69 It was in the end Hume’s social 
existence in the polite milieu of Edinburgh’s clubs and societies that legitimised his 
philosophical reflections and at the same time rescued him from its pernicious effects.70  
Writers and philosophers of the eighteenth-century display a striking concern with 
passions, sensibility and the receptiveness of the body. It is not by coincidence that Hume 
makes the passions central to his science of man. Even if, according to Hume, reason could 
not master the passions, the culture of sensibility directly aimed at cultivating the tender and 
agreeable passions. Many novelists aimed at doing exactly this when they discovered the 
power of the novel to instruct its public in the behaviour, manners and emotions of 
sensibility. Cheyne’s influence on the culture of sensibility would be marked in particular by 
his intimate friendship with Samuel Richardson (1689-1761).71 Through his epistolary 
sentimental novels, Pamela: Or, Virtue Rewarded (1740), Clarissa: Or the History of a 
Young Lady (1748) and The History of Sir Charles Grandison (1753), Richardson brought 
Cheyne’s spirits and nerves, with their various modes of tension, relaxation and vibration, 
into literature, at times to take it seriously and at times to mock it. As George Rousseau 
describes,  
 
In Richardson’s last novel, Sir Charles Grandison (1753), the willowy heroine Clementina 
endures the three stages of “vapours” Cheyne described in The English Malady, proceeding from 
fits, fainting, lethargy, or restlessness to hallucinations, loss of memory, and despondency 
(Cheyne recommended bleeding and blistering at this stage), with a final decline toward 
consumption. To cure her, Sir Charles follows Cheyne, prescribing diet and medicine, exercise, 
diversion, and rest, and the story is considerably affected when Clementina’s parents adopt 
unquestioningly Dr. Robert James’s further recommendation that “in Virgins arrived at Maturity, 
and rendered mad by Love, Marriage is the most efficacious Remedy”.72 
 
Cheyne’s and Richardson’s friendship symbolised the strong reciprocal interaction and yet 
tension between the sciences and literature in the eighteenth century, especially as regards the 
science of sensibility. They played a considerable role in constructing not only the languages 
but also the lived experiences of sensibility.73  
 
Burke and the science of sensibility 
Edmund Burke was not a professional physician and it is clear that physiology was not his 
primary concern. Nevertheless, he was interested in physiological processes and the 
Philosophical Enquiry should be read as part of the new culture of nerves and sensibilities 
that penetrated the sciences as well as the arts. The Philosophical Enquiry detailed the 
psychological and neuro-physiological origins of the sublime without falling into reductionist 
materialism. In order to do this, Burke drew on centuries old philosophies of the passions but 
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even more on the tensed nerves and relaxed solids of his day, displaying a deeper 
understanding of the interaction between philosophy and medicine. Burke explains, for 
instance, that a large object evokes the sublime because of its physiological impact on the eye 
and the nervous system: 
 
all the light reflected from a large body should strike the eye in one instant; yet we must 
suppose that the body itself is formed of a vast number of distinct points, every one of which, 
or the ray from every one, makes an impression on the retina. So that, though the image of 
one point should cause but a small tension of this membrane, another, and another, and 
another stroke, must in their progress cause a very great one, until it arrives at last to the 
highest degree; and the whole capacity of the eye, vibrating in all its parts, must approach 
near to the nature of what causes pain, and consequently must produce an idea of the 
sublime.74  
 
Burke’s close attention to the optics of perception, the physiology of the retina, the tensions 
produced in the vibrating membranes of the eye are striking. Drawing on Newtonian theories 
of perception as well as Cheyne’s terminology of tension and vibration, Burke goes on to 
explain that 
  
the eye must traverse the vast space of such bodies with great quickness, and consequently 
the fine nerves and muscles destined to the motion of that part must be very much strained; 
and their great sensibility must make them highly affected by this straining.75 
 
In book IV of the Philosophical Enquiry, Burke aspired to provide a physiological account of 
the origins of the beautiful and the sublime. On the one hand, he explicitly asserted that he 
was following the Newtonian method, and he contributed to the Scottish Enlightenment 
project of a ‘science of man’.76 As we have seen, his association with Christopher Nugent 
exposed him to the latest physiological and neurological developments. On the other hand, 
Burke took care not to pledge allegiance to one specific scientific model in all of its details. 
He followed them in so far as they conformed to his own physiological and psychological 
experiences as well as his philosophical understanding, and this resulted in a generalised 
picture of the science and philosophy of his day. At some point, he even chided Newton for 
not adhering to his own cautious rule of avoiding hypotheses. When Newton accounted for 
gravitation by a subtle elastic ether, in the eyes of Burke, he ‘seemed to have quitted his usual 
cautious manner of philosophizing.’77 Furthermore, the physiological processes he described 
should be understood as only the ‘efficient cause’ of the sublime. Burke organised the 
Philosophical Enquiry according to the four Aristotelian causes, and besides the focus on 
efficient causality in Book IV, Burke also paid attention to the formal and material causes of 
the sublime and beauty in Books I-III respectively. In this way, he aspired to an eclectic but 
complete scientific account of the origins of the beautiful and the sublime.78 
Aris Sarafianos has detailed a number of ways in which Burke was part of the medical 
and scientific ‘heterodoxy’ and how he used these aspects of his thought to develop his 
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aesthetic theory of the beautiful and the sublime. Sarafianos has compared Christopher 
Nugent’s descriptions of nervous illnesses and the ‘vibration’, ‘pulsation’ and ‘oscillation’ of 
solids and fluids in the body with Burke’s physiological explorations in the bodily states that 
corresponding to aesthetic experiences. Indeed, we can find many instances of intriguing 
physiological descriptions paired to aesthetic experiences in Burke. In order to explain why 
gentle variation is characteristic of the beautiful, he states: ‘Rest certainly tends to relax: yet 
there is a species of motion which relaxes more than rest; a gentle oscillatory motion, a rising 
and falling. (...) This will give a better idea of the beautiful, and point out its probable cause 
better, than almost anything else.’79 Nugent’s drastic therapies were mirrored in Burke’s 
descriptions of the physiology of the sublime, characterised by pain, labour, tensions, 
convulsions and spasms.80 In addition to this, however, Burke also paid attention to soft 
impulses, delicacy and smoothness, to the relaxed states of the body, which he connected to 
the experience of the beautiful. 
Richard Brocklesby (1722–1797), Burke’s schoolfellow in Ireland and lifelong friend, 
was also an important influence on Burke’s thought. Brocklesby owed his reputation in 
medicine to his important essay, ‘An Account of Some Experiments on the Sensibility and 
Irritability of the Several Parts of the Animals’ (1755). This text introduced the English to 
Albrecht von Haller’s (1708–1777) theories of the vital principle and its two essential 
properties of ‘sensibility’ and ‘irritability’. Recording a series of vivisections, Brocklesby’s 
intent was to scrutinise the different qualities and intensities of the expressions of animal 
pain. He listened to cries or other expressions of animal suffering and looked for spastic 
motions and contractions in order to determine the fluctuating degrees of sensibility and 
irritability of the different fibres and organs he pierced or lanced. Using pain as a primary 
instrument, Brocklesby and Haller drew a new anatomical map by making a distinction 
between sensibility and irritability: skin, nerves, and innervated parts were sensitive but 
motionless, while muscle fibres and membranes were insensible but moving.  
As Sarafianos has argued, Burke’s interest in pain and its relation to the sublime were 
inspired by Brocklesby’s work: 
 
Burke’s neurological discourse does not completely adopt Haller and Brocklesby’s rather 
rigid division between sensibility and irritability (...) Burke did extrapolate extensively from 
Brocklesby’s propositions, however, and developed his own original adaptations. In this 
process, Brocklesby’s physiological division between pain and insensibility was transformed 
into the aesthetic polarity between pain and pleasure. Pain figures as a higher order of 
sensibility, which Burke identified with the labours of the sublime. Pleasure, by contrast, 
represents a significantly diminished state of feeling, which Burke associated with the 
insipidity of the beautiful.81  
 
For Burke, these ideas signalled the birth of aesthetics as a true science that could be based 
on physiological as well as psychological principles. 
While the larger sensationist movement inspired Burke’s approach to aesthetics, 
philosophers and physicians had tried to give aesthetics a scientific basis and to understand 
the natural constituents of sensibility. What was it about the atmosphere or weather or 
conditions of objects that affect human sensibility? Prominent thinkers such as Jean-Baptiste 
Du Bos, Montesquieu, Arbuthnot and Winckelmann studied the effects of climate and natural 
geography on human sensibility, for instance. In this way they searched for the natural causes 
of the customs and the moral and artistic sensibilities of societies. Du Bos was famous for 
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arguing that climate rather than cultural causes were responsible for the formation of artists. 
The ancient Greeks lived in a mild climate, which promoted the sensibility of their nervous 
system. From this delicate constitution followed a sensibility for elegance, symmetry and 
harmony, which were the basic constituents of the beautiful. In his contribution to this 
volume, Sarafianos argues that Burke, inspired by Arbuthnot and others, inverted this idea. 
Moderate climates would lead to lazy, soft and effeminate temperaments. The Greeks had 
been able to create great art only because they had counteracted the effects of their moderate 
climate by strict discipline and exercise.  
Arbuthnot had still maintained the propensity for beauty in median climates, however, 
given the particular influence on sensibility and imagination. He granted northerners 
excellence in mathematics, philosophy and mechanics, which required judgement, industry 
and great application of mind. While Burke read Du Bos and Montesquieu enthusiastically, 
he did not think their theory fully explained one’s reaction to stimuli like weather. 
Furthermore, he revised the whole notion of sensibility through the notion of the sublime. 
Artists, he maintained, were better formed in climates like the English, which were 
characterised by physical intensity and extremes, and formed the sensory acuteness and 
vitality of the inhabitants. Burke proposed a sublime sensibility, informed by the pains, 
tensions and vibrations of a nervous body. Contrary to Cheyne’s milk diets, but similar to 
Nugent’s extreme remedies, Burke proposed the tonic regimes of the sublime as the best cure 
for the illnesses generated by civilised society, which he associated with languorous lifestyles 
and the effeminateness of the beautiful. Nevertheless, there were always two sides to this 
languor. On the one hand, one had to have some languor because one cannot only exist with 
tension and vibration. On the other hand, with too many luxuries, the rich and leisured ones 
might grow unable to fight diseases or hardships. In short, beauty requires the sublime and 
the sublime requires beauty even at the level of physiology.82 
Although Burke was not a physician, his work can be read as a contribution to 
eighteenth-century ‘science’ in the broadest sense. As we have shown, Burke drew 
extensively on contemporary medical debates. The newest physiological theories on fibres, 
nerves and solids entered his descriptions of the bodily states related to the sublime and the 
beautiful. Also the discourse of nerve doctors, studying the complex interactions between 
body and mind, informed Burke’s ‘science of sensibility’. From Burke’s and other 
contemporaries’ detailed descriptions of the subtle responses to different impressions, based 
on bodily disposition, sensibility as well as contextual factors, the nascent field of aesthetics 
would emerge. Furthermore, Burke’s work was also part of a burgeoning ‘science of man’, 
that was further developed by the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment. The science of 
sensibility was also at the basis of a new anthropology, including a new theory of morals and 
manners, as will be elaborated in the next section. 
 
 
PART 2: Sensibility, morals and manners 
 
Moral sentiments and sensibility 
In Sense and Sensibility, Jane Austen describes the encounter between two protagonists, 
Marianne and Willoughby. After weeks of an increasingly intimate acquaintanceship, 
Willoughby suddenly leaves Marianne after a quick goodbye. In this scene, Austen refers to 
characteristic sentimental scenes of ‘virtue in distress’: an innocent, sensible and morally 
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pure figure is placed in a hard world full of corruption and deceit. After the meeting, 
Marianne runs out of the room in violent affliction and with flowing tears. Immediate 
sympathetic reactions follow from her mother and sister. ‘Mrs. Dashwood felt too much for 
speech, and instantly quitted the parlour to give way in solitude to the concern and alarm 
which this sudden departure occasioned,’ returning much later with eyes red from weeping.83 
Marianne’s distress would be displayed only to full potential in the following months. In his 
Philosophical Enquiry, Burke expresses the specifically heightened affective impact of such 
a story of ‘virtue in distress’: ‘Our delight, in cases of this kind, is very greatly heightened, if 
the sufferer be some excellent person who sinks under an unworthy fortune.’84 Moral 
sentiments and aesthetic experiences were knit closely together in the eighteenth century.  
Displays of sentimentality such as Marianne’s or Mrs. Dashwood’s were not only 
reserved for female heroes.85 ‘Virtue in distress’ was equally applicable as a theme to male 
characters in the literature of sensibility. Samuel Richardson created the supreme emblem of 
masculine emotional susceptibility with Sir Charles Grandison. The novel’s preface makes 
explicit the basic elements of the plot: the hero acts ‘uniformly well thro’ a Variety of trying 
Scenes, because all his Actions are regulated by one steady Principle: A Man of Religion and 
Virtue; of Liveliness and Spirit; accomplished and agreeable; happy in himself, and a 
Blessing to others.’86 In order to further his goal of a reformation of manners, Richardson 
staged open as well as performative emotional behaviour by men.87 This behaviour was 
accepted and even expected in the social context of his sentimental heroes. Similarly, David, 
in Fielding’s David Simple is not able to ‘stifle his Sighs and Tears’ on hearing a tale of 
distress because ‘he did not think it beneath a Man to cry from Tenderness’.88 Fielding 
explicitly promotes sentimentalism and public emotional display as an attribute of male 
manners, while yet parodying such behaviour. Not only sentimental authors, however, but 
even stern philosophers such as David Hume, as John Mullan has argued, self-consciously 
tried to live out literary and philosophical models of sensibility and social being.89 
Sentimental novels created pathos through conventional situations and rhetoric, using 
archetypical characters and narrative plots. As Brycchan Carey points out: ‘the quintessential 
sentimental moment is when one or more of the characters begin to weep.’90 In the novels, 
the emotional and bodily responses of the characters are described in great detail, and the 
behaviour of the heroes is offered to the reader for identification and imitation. ‘At these 
moments, it is often made clear that the reader is supposed to weep too, and sentimental 
authors put a great deal of effort into bringing this about.’91 In the culture of sensibility, there 
was a general belief that the experience of reading, characterised by bodily and emotional 
affectations, could intimately affect the living experience. The novel discovered its own 
powers, not as fiction or fantasy, but as literature of instruction. It was challenged by a 
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tension at the heart of the notion of sensibility, however. Sensibility was supposed to 
undergird a generalized social instinct or a universal sociability. At the same time, one 
needed to look inwards, as the resources of sensitivity were considered as private and 
exceptional. John Mullan has argued that novels tried to resolve this tension by a special kind 
of inward attention, by looking at a feeling as articulated by the body.92 Novels taught their 
readers to reproduce the appropriate emotional responses in those situations that resembled 
scenes in the book. One should know when to sigh, when to weep, or when to declare the 
inexpressibility of one’s feelings in order to achieve certain ends in society. The body was the 
locus where a private and exceptional sensibility was exteriorized and socialized. Hence the 
special concern with the particulars of bodily symptoms, and the merging of medical and 
literary discourse. Sentimental literature instigated a pedagogy of sentimentality, based on 
detailed emotional as well as physiological descriptions, and the reading public was 
disciplined in specific behavioural codes. Indeed, Richardson intended his novels to have 
such an educational effect in order to carry through his reformation of manners.93  
In more extreme cases, sentimental heroes could be destroyed by their delicate 
sensibilities when confronted with the common rudeness of life. Such heroes were 
represented not for imitation but for sympathy. The moral function of these narratives was to 
evoke compassion, and in invigorating this feeling to instil a moral sense. In reaction to 
critics of sentimental novels, their proponents justified them by stressing their uplifting 
character, and they reinforced their utility for the improvement of morals. Being confronted 
with misery and injustice invoked sympathy and moral feelings and these novels trained and 
fortified the moral sense. ‘These weaker figures are vulnerable and threatened in worldly 
terms, but are nonetheless celebrated for their ideals and emotions within the relationship 
created between reader and text.’94 Critics objected that cultivating such a sensibility could be 
defective, however. Some readers were more affected at fictional accounts of misery and 
distress, they exclaimed, than at real instances of them. Although these people considered the 
tears they shed when reading novels or contemplating pictures as undoubted proofs of virtue, 
religious writers remarked that these feelings did not make them change their conduct and 
they continued their oppressive, unjust and even criminal deeds.95 As Hannah More 
disparaged those with a false sensibility in her poem Sensibility (1780) as ‘who thinks feign’d 
sorrows all her tears deserve, and weeps o’er WERTER, while her children starve,’96 she 
made clear that moral feelings invoked by an aesthetic experience do not necessarily translate 
into better morality. As this passage shows, over the course of the eighteenth century, the 
reaction to sensibility shifted from more or less positive and open towards the beginning of 
the century to critical and hostile by the end of the century. 
At the dawn of the culture of sensibility, the moral and aesthetic aspects of sensibility 
were thought closely together. The first theorists of sensibility, such as Shaftesbury and 
Hutcheson, developed a view in which the good and the beautiful were nearly 
interchangeable. They reacted against Locke’s empiricism, which they thought would lead to 
moral relativism. In his attack on innate ideas, Locke had argued against the notion that 
human beings inherently recognise moral truths by pointing out the evidence of widespread 
cultural diversity in human habits, manners and morals. Locke’s critics accused him of 
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undermining the difference between right and wrong. Locke had given some answers to 
avoid the perceived sceptical and relativistic consequences of his theory, but these did not 
satisfy the third Earl of Shaftesbury.97 
In his Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times (1711), Shaftesbury turned to 
Neo-Platonism and Stoicism. He found in Neo-Platonism support for innate ideas, including 
the idea of the Good. In the Stoic reflection on the beauty of the ordered universe, he found a 
principle of order and unity in human nature. Shaftesbury considered the universality of 
human nature evident from shared convictions in matters of taste, morality, and a recognition 
of the divine; he regarded diversity as only a side effect of custom and education. By building 
on these ancient sources, Shaftesbury built a naturalistic basis for morality and he insisted on 
the existence of a natural disposition toward virtue. From Shaftesbury’s Platonist 
identification of the Good and the Beautiful, it followed that there was also a natural 
disposition toward the Beautiful. It was a common sensibility, therefore, that served as the 
foundation of his moral and aesthetic systems. By combining the notion of an innate ‘moral 
sense’ as well as the idea of a common human nature, Shaftesbury was able to reassert the 
existence of a universally valid moral system. Similarly, an innate aesthetic sensibility 
grounded a universally valid aesthetic taste.  
The Scottish Enlightenment, in developing a ‘science of man’, would adopt as a basic 
principle this idea of a unity of mankind, even if they quarrelled about the source of this 
universality, i.e. about whether it should be sought in ‘sense’ or in ‘sensibility’. Francis 
Hutcheson (1694–1746), an Irishman with Scottish ancestors who became professor of moral 
philosophy in Glasgow, was one of the original forces behind the Scottish Enlightenment. 
Hutcheson developed Shaftesbury’s theory and reconciled it with Locke’s ‘observational’ 
methodology and his critique of innate ideas. He followed Shaftesbury in seeing moral and 
aesthetic responses as natural and instinctive, and he embedded them in a universal human 
nature.98 He proposed an ‘internal sense’, a faculty that was understood as part of a basic 
human constitution but that should not be considered ‘innate’ in the Lockean sense, which 
established a natural foundation for ethical and aesthetic responses. This ‘sense’, a faculty or 
capacity that combined an element of moral or aesthetic perception and judgement, acted 
before any input from the will or reason. Hutcheson placed morality on a non-rational, 
instinctive footing, but at the same time, the naturalization of morality ensured its uniformity 
and constancy. This put morality squarely in the domain of ‘sensibility’, joining elements of 
perception and judgement, but giving preference to an instinctive natural response over 
reason.   
 
Burke’s sublime ethics of sensibility 
In the Philosophical Enquiry, Burke rejected the direct connection between beauty and virtue 
propounded by Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. He states that this connection has put morality on 
‘foundations altogether visionary and unsubstantial’. Burke strongly opposes Shaftesbury and 
Hutcheson: ‘We may easily see, how far the application of beauty to virtue may be made 
with propriety. The general application of this quality to virtue, has a strong tendency to 
confound our ideas of things; and it has given rise to an infinite deal of whimsical theory […] 
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This loose and inaccurate manner of speaking, has therefore misled us both in the theory of 
taste and of morals.’99 
Ian Harris and Daniel O’Neill have argued that in connecting beauty with virtue, 
Hutcheson made ethics independent of theology. With an innate or natural moral sense, there 
seemed no need for religion in the guidance of morals any longer. This was unacceptable for 
Burke.100 In addition to what Harris and O’Neill point out, a second reason for disconnecting 
beauty and virtue is that Burke did not consider the beautiful to necessarily be good. The 
beautiful makes one languid and weak. ‘Beauty acts by relaxing the solids of the whole 
system.’101 It leads to inaction and indolence: vices according to Burke. In contrast, as Kant 
would argue later in the eighteenth century, it is the sublime, as counter-balanced to beauty, 
which strengthens the spirits and leads to virtue. In the following passage, Burke put forward 
his views in a particular forceful way: 
 
Providence has so ordered it, that a state of rest and inaction, however it may flatter our 
indolence, should be productive of many inconveniences; that it should generate such disorders, 
as may force us to have recourse to some labor, as a thing absolutely requisite to make us pass 
our lives with tolerable satisfaction; for the nature of rest is to suffer all the parts of our bodies to 
fall into a relaxation, that not only disables the members from performing their functions, but 
takes away the vigorous tone of fibre which is requisite for carrying on the natural and necessary 
secretions. At the same time, that in this languid inactive state, the nerves are more liable to the 
most horrid convulsions, than when they are sufficiently braced and strengthened. Melancholy, 
dejection, despair, and often self-murder, is the consequence of the gloomy view we take of 
things in this relaxed state of body. The best remedy for all these evils is exercise or labor; and 
labor is a surmounting of difficulties, an exertion of the contracting power of the muscles; and as 
such resembles pain, which consists in tension or contraction, in everything but degree. Labor is 
not only requisite to preserve the coarser organs, in a state fit for their functions; but it is equally 
necessary to these finer and more delicate organs, on which, and by which, the imagination and 
perhaps the other mental powers act.102  
 
All these personal evils, especially those associated with nervous disorders such as 
melancholy, dejection and despair, can be solved by exercise and labour, by the right doses of 
pain and tension.  
Burke’s maximalist physiology seems to lead naturally to what can be called an ‘ethics’ 
of the sublime. For Burke, as for Adam Smith, morality is based on sympathy. According to 
Burke, sympathy was one of the three principal passions that formed ‘the great chain of 
society’. As opposed to imitation and ambition, it presented a moral impulse to ‘enter in the 
concerns of others’.103 In The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), Smith would elaborate a 
complete moral system based on the notion of sympathy. When the book appeared, two years 
after the Philosophical Enquiry, Burke reacted enthusiastically. He wrote to Smith: ‘I am not 
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only pleased with the ingenuity of your Theory; I am convinced of its solidity and Truth […]. 
A theory like yours founded on the Nature of man, which is always the same, will last 
[…].’104 Later, Burke would write a glowing review of Smith’s book in the Annual Register: 
by ‘making approbation and disapprobation the tests of virtue and vice, and showing that 
those are founded on sympathy,’ Burke wrote, Smith ‘raises from this simple truth, one of the 
most beautiful fabrics of moral theory, that has perhaps ever appeared.’105 
In Burke’s original sections on sympathy in the Philosophical Enquiry, we find the 
origin of morality explained. Due to sympathy, we are moved as others are moved, ‘and are 
never suffered to be indifferent spectators of almost any thing which men can do or suffer.’106 
It is by sympathy that ‘we are put into the place of another man, and affected in many 
respects as he is affected.’ If his affectation turns upon self-preservation and pain, sympathy 
is a source of the sublime.107 Burke is particularly interested in how we are affected by the 
feelings of our fellow creatures in situations of real distress. There must be a stimulus, which 
causes one to notice or acknowledge suffering. Not only did Burke express what was going 
on in the literature and philosophy of the period, he also attempted to articulate the etiology 
of sensibility. Behind ‘the origin of our ideas’, Burke is convinced that ‘we have a degree of 
delight, and that no small one, in the real misfortunes and pains of others.’ Burke rejects the 
classical view that artistic representations of disasters and suffering induce pleasure while the 
real events would shock and inspire only horror. He objects that the real events cause 
pleasure just as well.108 In entering into the emotions of the victims, we experience suffering, 
pain and angst. If there is no encounter, then there is no affective sensibility. But both terror 
and pity have a component of pleasure in them.109 Burke concludes that there must be 
pleasure in them, because experience teaches that man is attracted by situations of distress.  
This combination or oscillation of pleasure and pain, characteristic of the sublime, is 
what makes morality possible.110 Burke’s experiential, inductive methodology guides him to 
discover the constituents of morality by studying the many instances of pleasure and 
displeasure. If viewing others in distress was only painful, Burke explains, ‘we would shun 
with the greatest care all persons and places that could excite such a passion.’ But most 
people have the opposite reaction and eagerly pursue the spectacle of calamities, because it 
touches with delight. Sympathy creates a mixture of pleasure and pain, of delight and 
uneasiness. This leads Burke to go beyond the Hutchesonian or even Smithean description of 
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uneasiness. ‘The delight we have in such things hinders us from shunning scenes of misery; 
and the pain we feel prompts us to relieve ourselves in relieving those who suffer.’ Sympathy 
attracts us to scenes of calamity and makes us help the victims as well. According to Burke, 
there is divine providence behind this fortunate coalescence of elements: ‘as our Creator has 
designed we should be united by the bond of sympathy, he has strengthened that bond by a 
proportionate delight; and there most where our sympathy is most wanted, in the distress of 
others.’ 
Although Burke replaces Shaftesbury’s and Hutcheson’s morality of beauty with an 
ethics of the sublime, he agrees with them that morality is not grounded in abstract reason, 
but in ‘an instinct that works us to its own purposes, without concurrence’. Sympathy works 
antecedent to any reasoning. These feelings ‘merely arise from the mechanical structure of 
our bodies, or from the natural frame and constitution of our minds.’ For Burke, sympathy, 
defined by Johnson as ‘mutual sensibility’,111 is grounded in the physiological structure of the 
body and the nervous system. God builds this sensibility into human physiology in such a 
way that it is maximally beneficent for mankind in grounding moral actions and making man 
help others in situations of need.112 
 
True and false sensibility 
In the first half of the eighteenth century, the concepts ‘sensibility’ and ‘sentiment’ included 
elements of perception, passion and judgement. A ‘sentiment’ combined head and heart. It 
was a moral reflection, a rational opinion about the rights and wrongs of human conduct. But 
this elevated thought was also influenced by emotion. In the course of the eighteenth century, 
the proportion of judgement and emotion, reason and instinct, was widely debated and 
constantly negotiated, especially by the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment. As a result of 
these developments, the meaning of the terms shifted. While sensibility was first 
conceptualized as good and necessary, and described as exquisite and delicate, it became 
pitched to the extreme later in the century. What Austen still called potent, strong, 
affectionate and acute and Hannah More called precious was characterised as overstretched 
(Wollstonecraft), excessive (Blair) in the late eighteenth century, and even more negatively, 
as mawkish (Coleridge), sickly (Byron) and morbid (Southey) by the nineteenth century.113 
At the same time, sensibility gradually lost its ‘sensible’ characteristics of good reason and 
judgement. What the Scottish Enlightenment had treated as a good and providentially 
designed ‘instinct’, a common sense that could counter the more excessive conclusions of 
reason on the loose (skepticism, relativism), became a purely emotional and unreasonable 
power. Sensibility and sentiment shifted into nineteenth-century sentimentalism, an excessive 
and irrational emotionality. As long as sensibility was a good and necessary constituent of 
culture, its characteristics were accepted and expected as part of male behaviour. Coincident 
with the changes in the valuation of sensibility, the notion would become more and more 
associated with femininity.114 
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A changing evaluation of ‘sensibility’ can be traced beautifully in the work of Mary 
Wollstonecraft.115 In Mary, a Fiction (1788), Wollstonecraft was fully immersed in the 
culture of sensibility. Sensibility was still the most exquisite feeling of which the human soul 
is susceptible. The concept of sensitivity was liberating for women, because it gave women 
their own discourse and their own public sphere, apart from the male dominated classical 
discourses. This infatuation with the culture of sensibility can also be found in her early 
pedagogical works. In A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792), however, 
Wollstonecraft shifted one hundred and eighty degrees. This sustained critique of the moralist 
literature that aimed at constructing female character was built upon an unmasking of the 
culture of sensibility as a patriarchal tool of oppression. Suddenly, Wollstonecraft abhorred 
the ‘affected style’ and ‘sentimental rant’ of the literature of sensibility. The content of this 
kind of literature, however, was even worse, because the characteristic representations of this 
literature reduced women to creatures of sensation. The identification of femininity and 
sensibility was a trap, which was constructed to keep women away from the realms of 
thought and reason and confined them to the emotions of the body. 
‘Novels, music, poetry, and gallantry, all tend to make women the creatures of sensation, 
and their character is thus formed in the mould of folly’, Wollstonecraft wrote. ‘This 
overstretched sensibility naturally relaxes the other powers of the mind, and prevents intellect 
from attaining that sovereignty which it ought to attain.’116 For Wollstonecraft, sensibility 
stands as the opposite of reason. She pointed out a fundamental contradiction in the view of 
the moralists of sensibility. Christian doctrine encourages the faithful to break free from 
concerns of the body and seek their salvation in a spiritual life. Women, however, are made 
slaves of the senses, and in this way half of humanity is condemned to eternal damnation. 
‘And what is sensibility? “Quickness of sensation; quickness of perception; delicacy.” Thus it 
was defined by Dr. Johnson; and the definition gives me no other idea than of the most 
exquisitely polished instinct. I discern not a trace of the image of God in either sensation or 
matter. Refined seventy times seven, they are still material; intellect dwells not there; nor will 
fire ever make lead gold!’117 
In four years time, Wollstonecraft had radically shifted her views on the culture of 
sensibility. Janet Todd and Daniel O’Neill have argued that this happened because of a 
controversy with Edmund Burke.118 In the wake of Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in 
France (1790), in which he strongly condemned this radical political event, Wollstonecraft 
reacted by defending the revolution as heralding a new and more just order. But 
Wollstonecraft also recognised that the culture of sensibility undergirded Burke’s general 
philosophical position, detailed in the Philosophical Enquiry and latent in his later political 
writings. Therefore, in rejecting the culture of sensibility, she attacked what she perceived to 
be the roots of the problem. She perceived that the science of sensibility, the naturalisation of 
morals and manners that was part of the Scottish Enlightenment project of a ‘science of man’, 
were at the basis of Burke’s conservatism. In contrast, Wollstonecraft denied that the 
perceived ‘sensibility’ of women was a natural state. Rather, it was a social construction that 
served to oppress the ‘weaker’ sex. Given this epistemological position, not fettered by a 
Lockean sensationalism or Scottish naturalism, Wollstonecraft felt justified in urging a 
revolution in female manners. What for Burke could only look like an unnatural and 
dangerous movement, Wollstonecraft regarded as a rebalancing of a centuries old socially 
enforced injustice. 
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In Wollstonecraft’s last work, Maria, or the Wrongs of Woman (published posthumously 
in 1798), she distinguished between true and false sensibility in rewriting the traditional 
theme of feminine ‘virtue in distress’. False sensibility was a sentimentalism resulting from 
untutored instinctive feelings, cultivated into extremes. This intoxicated and excessive 
sensibility was a form of pernicious enthusiasm – not the Shaftesburian variant of inspiration 
and sociability, but the fanatic and irrational enthusiasm that resulted from a defect of 
cognition.119 In contrast, true sensibility was a powerful sympathy for other people’s feeling, 
instructed also by rational considerations. Instead of sentimentality and pity, the spectacle of 
women in distress evoked solidarity and sympathy. The male spectator recognised the 
sources of oppression that made women so miserable, and he was prepared to help them to 
change society. Sensibility had come full turn. From a subtle balance between passion and 
judgement, it had fallen into the extremes of sentimentality, and its rational element was later 
recuperated in a ‘true’ sensibility (and in Wollstonecraft’s case, with revolutionary potential), 
to be distinguished from the false sentimentalist variants. 
The balance between ‘sense’ and ‘sensibility’ was played out differently by other 
authors. The discourse of sensibility was multivalent, and authors fought over subtle 
distinctions in the relation between reason and passion, judgement and instinct. Hugh Blair 
(1718–1800), a divine from Edinburgh, represented another exponent of the highpoint of the 
culture of sensibility. He was an important minister, became professor of rhetoric at 
Edinburgh, and produced enormously influential texts in both fields, such as the Lectures on 
Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (1783), and his Sermons (1801), written in different periods of his 
life and rewritten for a comprehensive publication in 1800. Blair was a man of letters and had 
always been interested in literature. He had written an essay, ‘On the Beautiful’, as a student, 
which was noticed by Stevenson, and later he would write on the question of taste. He also 
supported the newly emerging genre of the novel, which he believed could be particularly 
useful for moral instruction and cultivating sensibility. His writings had strongly influenced 
Wollstonecraft in her early period. 
In his sermon, ‘On sensibility’, based on the biblical exhortation ‘Rejoice with them that 
rejoice, weep with them that weep’ (Romans, xii.15), Blair describes sensibility as the 
essential constituent of a superior moral life.120 Blair defines sensibility, ‘a word which in 
modern times we hear in the mouth of every one’, as the temper that disposes us to feel with 
others. God has implanted this social instinct in the original constitution of human nature to 
counterbalance the selfish affections, which are necessary for self preservation. Sensibility 
constitutes an essential part of religious character, and its opposites, such as cruelty or 
hardness of heart, clearly contradict religion. Although sensibility, as a natural capacity, is 
not bestowed on everyone equally, it is nevertheless part of the perfection in our nature. It is 
Christ who exemplified this perfection of sensibility in the highest degree.’ Blair explains 
that religious and social actions lose much of their value if they are not accompanied with a 
honest sensibility. Acts from conscience and principle alone seem feeble compared with the 
different complexion given to the same acts, if they ‘flow from the sensibility of a feeling 
hart’.121 
Of course, persons with sensibility are vulnerable to being wounded by the distress that 
can be perceived everywhere in the world. But Blair accepted Burke’s sublime ethics in 
arguing that ‘when the heart is strongly moved by any of the kind affections, even when it 
pours itself forth in virtuous sorrow, a secret attractive charm mingles with the painful 
emotion; there is joy in the midst of grief. […] The griefs which sensibility introduces are 
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counterbalanced by pleasures which flow from the same source. Sensibility heightens in 
general the human powers, and is connected with acuteness in all our feelings.’122 As in 
Burke, man’s sensibilious constitution, causing pleasure and pain at the same time, prompted 
man to moral action.   
Because sensibility had become the ‘favourite and distinguishing virtue of the age’, it 
also suffered abuses. Many assumed an appearance of sensibility when there was no 
sensibility in reality: ‘softness of manners must not be mistaken for true sensibility.’123 
Excessive sentimentality is suspicious, and might be a studied pose to hide an unfeeling 
hardness. ‘Professions of sensibility on every trifling occasion, joined with the appearance of 
excessive softness, afford always much ground for distrust. They create the suspicion of a 
studied character. Frequently, under a negligent and seemingly rough manner, there lies a 
tender and feeling heart.’124 Blair gave this a curiously gendered twist, however, referring 
again to a Burkean exaltation of exertion: ‘Manliness and sensibility are so far from being 
incompatible, that the truly brave are for the most part generous and humane; while the soft 
and effeminate are hardly capable of any vigorous exertion of affection.’125 An excessive or 
false sensibility went against the aims of morality, because one would be so strongly afflicted 
as to avoid scenes of misery. These artificial affectations are often only an excuse for 
selfishness and inaction. Someone with a genuine sensibility always obeys the dictates of his 
nature, according to Blair. But he warns that, even with a good sensibility, one should not rest 
the whole of morality on it. Sensibility is a necessary constituent of morality, but it remains 
only an instinctive feeling. It should be strengthened and confirmed, not by reason but by 
‘principle’, i.e., it should be checked by the traditional morality of the Church.   
 
Sensibility, taste and manners 
Reacting against a perceived Lockean relativism and Humean scepticism, most proponents of 
the Scottish Enlightenment stressed a sensibility that was grounded in human nature. Genius 
lies in the sensibility of the heart, not in reason. The true distinction of civilization lies in 
being a ‘man of taste’. The notions of taste, politeness and civility, as well as sensibility, 
were part of a thorough revision of social theory, constructed in response to a rapidly 
changing social situation. The eighteenth century saw the rise of a commercial society and a 
concomitant prominence of the merchant classes. Before, civility had been defined by the 
landed gentry according to a classical model of civic virtue, developed by virtue of the free 
time available to those with landed property. In a world undergoing rapid economic 
transformation, threatening to undermine these traditional relations and the moral values 
based on them, Whig thinkers and later Scottish Enlightenment philosophers developed a 
new ethical framework based on a new notion of manners.126 
As Lawrence Klein has shown, Shaftesbury provided the basic conceptual materials for 
this new culture of politeness.127 Despite Shaftesbury’s wide ranging interests and broad 
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reputation, Klein identifies his basic project as political. Shaftesbury’s work aimed at 
legitimizing the post 1688 Whig regime, which established the dominance of gentlemen over 
English society. The notions of politeness, taste and sensibility were central to Shaftesbury’s 
project of designing the norms and content of this new era of gentlemanly culture.128 While 
during the Restoration, the court and the Tories were seen as the protectors of the arts and 
sciences, and the Whigs, as a country party, were presented as impolite and uninformed, the 
new prominence of the Whigs necessitated a cultural revaluation.129 Shaftesbury relocated the 
traditional discourse by disparaging court culture as dazzling, luxurious and decadent and by 
elevating the politeness and sensibility of the newly constructed Whig character. This new 
social character was expressed in the body of the gentleman, as well as in his possessions, the 
spaces he occupied, the skills and habits he acquired, and in his social life. Supported by 
cultural prominence and financial sway, gentlemen and the higher middle classes became 
more and more the arbiter of high culture and taste. Their rising influence prompted them to 
create new values and to forge a new association, now between commerce and civility. The 
notion of politeness proved to be a great tool for accommodating a class hierarchy to a 
commercial society. ‘Politeness’ left open the possibility of social mobility, needed to 
integrate the newly affluent and powerful, but it could at the same time function as an 
important marker of class distinctions.130 This helps explain the emergence of a 
fundamentally important language of manners in the eighteenth century. 
Scottish Enlightenment thinkers developed Shaftesbury’s ideas and further integrated 
politeness with commercial society. They believed that the rich web of social relationships 
created by commercial society changed the savage into a refined moral personality, identified 
by sensibility and polite manners. Vice versa, it was also in the interest of commerce that 
men cultivated politeness and sensitivity. They conceived of the history of mankind as a 
history of increasingly rich social forms that developed hand in hand with more refined 
sensitivity and manners, and this was reflected in progressive stages of civilization. On the 
one hand, moral sentiments were part of the natural human constitution. On the other hand, 
there was an evolving system of manners that progressed. Civility and refined morality, 
therefore, were characterised by a delicate taste and politeness, which were not naturally 
available to man, but had to be cultivated as a ‘second nature’. Sensibility was at once a 
natural and universal instinct, a marker of physiological and psychological exceptionality as 
well as a sign of an acquired civilisation and politeness that stratified society. As we can see 
here, morality, sociability, and even politics were based on the multivalent meanings of 
sensibility. This complex intertwinement of discourses is also visible in Burke’s work. Out of 
sensibility and mutual sympathy, morality and society emerged.131 In the Enquiry, Burke 
made clear that sensibility and the experience of the beautiful was intertwined with 
sociability. In the Reflections, he would explain how feelings of sympathy and reverence, 
essential to the polis, were rooted in sensibility. Patriotic sentiment, for instance, was 
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sustained by beauty, taste, and decorum.132 As Richard Bourke has argued, for Burke, honour 
was a variant of politeness, and it functioned for Burke as the very solvent with which society 
was maintained in a condition of peace and tranquillity.133 
Increasing commercial prosperity in the eighteenth century also led to the rising interest 
in material gratification. Consumerism gave rise to a cult of sensibility and taste, which could 
also be understood in a more sensualist sense. From the early eighteenth century, the debate 
over the moral implications of the new presence of luxury was vigorous. On the one hand, the 
middle classes wanted to distinguish themselves from the lower classes by their ability to 
pursue material pleasures and to develop a refined taste. On the other hand, they were wary 
of the bad associations of perceived aristocratic decadence and idleness. Furthermore, there 
was a widespread fear that consumerism could degenerate into indulgence in the vice of 
luxury, which threatened traditional moral and social values. ‘On the one hand, 
Enlightenment culture adapted itself to luxury as a positive social force, viewing it with 
confidence as an instrument (and indication) of the progress of civilisation. On the other 
hand, it feared luxury as a debilitating and corrosive social evil, clinging to classical critiques 
of excessive indulgence and wanton profligacy, urban chaos and plebeian idleness’.134 The 
crucial challenge, therefore, consisted in the reconciliation of the traditional opposites of 
pleasure and morality. How could one adapt luxury and at the same time be shielded from its 
evils?135  
An early provocative answer came from the Dutch physician and philosopher Bernard 
Mandeville. From his residence in London, he prompted a lively pamphlet war by his 
writings on luxury. In The Fable of the Bees:  or Private Vices, Publick Benefits (1714), he 
defined luxury as ‘a refinement in the gratification of the senses’, a form of sensibility closely 
related to taste. Mandeville accepted the basic philosophical maxim that human behavior is 
motivated by the passions to seek pleasure and to avoid pain. By seeking pleasure and 
indulging their desires for luxuries, Mandeville argued, the rich contributed to the expansion 
of commerce and the wider employment of the poor, a stimulation of the economy that was 
to the advantage of all. Mandeville’s aim was to explore the real ‘hidden springs’ of human 
action and to ‘anatomise the invisible part of man’, just like a physician or surgeon, instead of 
listening to the empty rhetoric of the moralists. His conclusion was that we all succumb to the 
vice of luxury, masking our vanity and avarice with hypocrisy. Society is a group of self-
interested individuals bound together, not by civic virtues or moral values, but by envy, 
competition and exploitation. The ruling order manipulates the public’s passions and desires 
by dissimulation in order to create public benefits out of private vices. This defence of 
luxury’s improving forces provided an important challenge to traditional assumptions of 
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luxury’s power to corrupt. Mandeville provocatively equated luxury with sensibility and 
taste, and he treated it as a positive force in society.136 
Scottish Enlightenment thinkers strongly dismissed this provocation. Hutcheson stressed 
that sensory pleasure was a response to aesthetic qualities and operated antecedent to any 
interest or advantage. Aesthetic pleasure was ‘pure’ and had nothing to do with self-interest 
or desire. He even strengthened this argument by connecting the beautiful with the moral. 
Similarly, Gerard described taste as innocent in his Essay on Taste. He conceded that human 
behavior is motivated by seeking pleasure, but the gratification of the senses was not the 
same as the possession of wealth. Taste is disinterested and does not aspire to the possession 
of the object. As such, it cannot lead to the seeking of advantage, avarice and the other vices 
associated to luxury. Only a perversion of taste leads to these ills. The philosophers of the 
Scottish Enlightenment solved the dilemma of pleasure and morality by means of the concept 
of taste. Taste implied a gratification of the senses without interest, which could be 
reconciled with morality. Their theories came even close to identifying taste and morality by 
placing both in an internal aesthetic and moral sense.137 
Adam Smith was impressed as well as appalled by Mandeville’s thought. In his work, he 
tried to find a new reconciliation of some of Mandeville’s insights with the criticism of his 
countrymen by addressing the paradox of integrating morality and consumer society.138 
Following the natural law tradition, he relegated questions of the distribution of property and 
the strong inequalities created by a commercial society to the domain of jurisprudence.139 The 
distribution of property had been historically generated, was subject to the law and thus a 
question of justice. In contrast, morality is based on feelings of sympathy and generosity, and 
becomes relegated to the domain of sensibility. The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) and 
the Wealth of Nations (1776), are not in opposition like ‘benevolence’ and ‘selfishness’, as is 
sometimes supposed.140 Rather, these two books symbolise Smith’s solution, which works by 
excluding morality from the debates on commercial society, and relegating it to the domain 
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of sensibility. Smith’s discourse about property rights is not about virtue, as it was in the 
civic tradition, but about justice – and although Smith had a distaste of the vulgar materialism 
of the nouveau riche, he conceded that their insatiable desires were good for the nation’s 
economy.141 
Morality could go together with pleasure, desire and even with selfish passions.142 For 
Burke, as we have seen, pleasure as a motivating force was necessary for prompting moral 
action. Similarly, Blair had argued that natural morality could be distinguished by being 
pleasurable, in contrast to an artificial morality solely based on duty. Someone moved by 
duty will move only slowly and reluctantly, Blair wrote. ‘As it is justice, not generosity, 
which impels him, he will often feel as a task what he is required by conscience to perform. 
Whereas, to him, who is prompted by a virtuous sensibility, every office of beneficence and 
humanity is a pleasure.’143 Burke makes clear that pleasure is not enough, however. His new 
view of sensibility stressed the importance of pain as well as pleasure. His solution to the 
problem of pleasure and morality also involved taste, but his was a taste formed by the 
sublime, which introduced pain, tension and exertion as central elements.   
As a result of these different approaches to resolve the tensions between a commercial 
society and morality, between pleasure and the good as well as between reason and instinct, 
the culture of sensibility, determined by the development of central concepts of ‘manners’, 
‘politeness’ and ‘taste’, took root in English culture. As an evident concomitant, aesthetics, 
the science of sensibility, with its development of the notion of taste and its close links to 
moral theory, came to the centre of attention.  
 
 
PART 3: Sensibility and Aesthetics 
 
Eighteenth-century sensibility and the arts 
Sentimental art and the literature of sensibility aimed at moving spectators and readers. The 
burgeoning field of aesthetics tried to theorise the mechanics of this process. What is 
beautiful? What is sublime? Why and how does it affect the spectator? Not only have 
aesthetic theories changed over the last 250 years, but aesthetic experiences have as well. 
Enlightenment thinkers for the most part believed in the universality of aesthetic response, 
the same everywhere and constant through the ages. Today, however, we can imagine that 
sensibilities might have changed and that readers and spectators might have reacted 
differently to the same objects. It is therefore instructive to start this section with an account 
of how eighteenth-century readers responded to a text. 
In a letter from Samuel Richardson (1689–1761), the famous printer and novelist, to his 
friend Aaron Hill (1685–1750), a connoisseur and theatre theorist, two different practices of 
reading are described. Richardson had received a text from Hill, entitled The Art of Acting, 
which he had agreed to print. The first time Richardson read the text, he read it with a 
printer’s eye, gauging the quality of the writing, the clarity of exposition and spotting errors. 
The second time, he read it as a reader of sensibility and a man of taste. His reaction was very 
different: 
 
Last Sunday I attempted to read it not as a Printer; and was not aware, that I should be so 
mechanically, as I may truly say, affected by it: I endeavoured to follow you in your wonderful 
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Description of the Force of Acting, in the Passion of Joy, Sorrow, Fear, Anger, &c. And my whole 
Frame, so nervously affected before, was shaken by it: I found, in short, such Tremors, such 
Startings, that I was unable to go thro’ it; and must reserve the Attempting it again, till your Oak 
Tincture (but just enter’d upon) has fortify’d the too relaxed, unmuscled Muscles, and braced those 
unbraced Nerves, which I have so long complained of, and so shall hope to find a Cure, and the 
Proof of it, from the same beneficent Hand.144 
 
The bodily affectation that resulted from his reading is stunning. They are so strong that he 
has to interrupt his reading. They are so overpowering that he has to reach for some 
medicinal help to fortify himself. What is striking also is that this was not a sentimental 
novel, like Clarissa, the novel Richardson was writing at the time, but a manual of acting 
practices presented in didactic verse. The argument of Hill’s text was that good acting, with 
emotions visibly expressed in the body, was a direct mechanical result of the actor’s mental 
identification with a particular passion. Acting was not a matter of artificiality, of 
conventional gestures, so Hill believed, but of a natural expression of felt emotions, 
generated by imitation or not. (Still, Hill made sure to provide long descriptions of the 
gestures that should belong to the actor’s ‘natural’ repertoire.)145 This strong connection 
between emotions and expression in the actor ensured that these bodily expressions would 
affect the spectators in a similar way. 
In this case, Richardson was not moved by looking at actors, but by reading the 
physiological descriptions of how passions should be expressed by the actors. These 
descriptions, by sympathy and imitation, create the corresponding passions with their 
accompanying bodily effects in the reader.146 As we can see, reading practices in the 
eighteenth century were remarkably corporeal, and the reader regarded these bodily 
symptoms minutely. Richardson recorded the detailed corporeal responses in his letter as a 
way of praise to the author. At the very least, it showed that the author had mastered the 
techniques of writing, that his descriptions were so convincing and vivid and that the act of 
reading ‘mechanically’ transformed the body of the reader into a trembling and shivering 
sensibilious object.  
‘That a sensible pleasure arises from poems and pictures, is a truth we are convinced of 
by daily experience’, Abbé J.-B. Du Bos (1670–1742) wrote in 1719 at the beginning of his 
Réflexions critiques sur la poésie et la peinture. Early in the eighteenth century, Du Bos 
developed a theory of the affective impact of art. Translated into English as Critical 
Reflections on Poetry, Painting and Music by Thomas Nugent in 1748, it was formative for 
later philosophers writing on art, including Burke.147 In this book, Du Bos wanted to instruct 
the reader regarding ‘his own sentiments, how they rise and are formed within him…to lay 
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open to him what passes within himself; that is, in one word, the most inward motions of the 
heart.’148 Du Bos thus wishes ‘to inquire philosophically into the nature and manner of the 
effects arising from their [painting and poetic] productions.’149 In order to do this, Du Bos 
developed a physiological and philosophical model, based on notions of sentiment and 
pleasure. Art is particularly forceful when it draws on sympathy, the natural mechanism by 
which man is linked to others. By imitating frightful spectacles, and engaging our sympathy, 
art arouses genuine passions and the spectator can escape boredom without having to pay the 
cost of real danger. Du Bos stressed the special kind of affective pleasure involved in art: it is 
‘a difficult matter to explain the nature of this pleasure, which bears so great a resemblance 
with affliction, and whose symptoms are sometimes as affecting, as those of the deepest 
sorrow. The arts of poetry and painting are never more applauded, than when they are most 
successful in moving us to pity.’150 
In the last part of the Philosophical Enquiry, Burke explored how words could have such 
a powerful impact.151 This was puzzling, especially since words seemed to affect us in a 
different way than natural objects or the visual arts. Burke rejected the common idea that 
words would raise ideas in the mind, and that it would be these ideas that affect us. In 
contrast, he put forward the claim that it was the materiality of the words themselves, their 
sound, instead of their representational function, that affected us directly. Not the mind, 
employed with ideas and representations, but the body, used to the sounds of certain words, 
reacted ‘mechanically’ to poetry and oratory. Words like ‘wise’, ‘valiant’, ‘generous’, ‘good’ 
and ‘great’ affect us directly, even if they are not applied to anything and hence remain 
meaningless. He also raises the example of a blind poet, who is affected by words as anyone 
else, but never had any representation associated with them. In our lives, words have become 
associated with certain effects or emotions. 
  
Such words are in reality but mere sounds; but they are sounds which being used on particular 
occasions, wherein we receive some good, or suffer some evil; or see others affected with good or 
evil; or which we hear applied to other interesting things or events; and being applied in such a 
variety of cases, that we know readily by habit to what things they belong, they produce in the 
mind, whenever they are afterwards mentioned, effects similar to those of their occasions. The 
sounds being often used without reference to any particular occasion, and carrying still their first 
impressions, they at last utterly lose their connection with the particular occasions that gave rise to 
them; yet the sound, without any annexed notion, continues to operate as before.152 
 
It is this power of words that Burke would employ to great effect in his speeches.153 Burke 
did not want to convince his public with superior ideas, but wanted to sway their passions 
with his words. For him, words primarily conveyed emotions, not ideas. Burke was part of a 
new movement of a rhetoric of sensibility, in part theorised by authors such as Smith and 
Blair in their lectures on rhetoric,154 but more prominently put into practice by Burke and 
other orators. Against the Ciceronian or classical rhetoric, which was the study of correct 
public speaking, the new rhetoric of sensibility brought the emotions to the fore. For Burke, 
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rhetoric is essentially emotional, and the preeminent source of the sublime, which is ‘the 
strongest emotion which the mind is capable of feeling.’155 
Brycchan Carey has studied the characteristics of this rhetoric of sensibility that were 
new or unique.156 He distinguishes six elements of sentimental persuasion: sentimental 
argument, the rejection of false sensibility, the sentimental parable, the establishment of a 
sentimental hero, sentimental diversion, and the emotional subversion of the intellect. Crucial 
to all these modes of persuasion is the invigorated prominence of emotion. In the rhetoric of 
sensibility sentimental arguments sometimes entirely replace reason with emotion. Evidence 
is substituted with intuition. Every occasion is seized to find the ability to sympathise. As a 
result the impact of a logical argument is diminished by appeal to the emotions. In classical 
rhetoric, these kind of ad populam arguments were considered below the dignity of a 
civilised orator. In the eighteenth century, however, emotionality became central to civilised 
behaviour. This justified sentimental argument as a new, delicate and refined species of 
rhetoric.157 
The culture of sensibility was particularly interested in what words, what figures of 
speech, what kinds of lines or figures moved the audience. Du Bos’ interest in the effects 
arising from artistic productions, Burke’s study of the affective impact of words, or 
Hogarth’s analysis of the response to the curved line made from rhetoric and the arts a real 
‘science of sensibility’. Sentimental novels can be considered ‘experiments’ in sensibility, 
playing with the effects of words and scenes on the nerves and fibres of the reader. 
Richardson’s account of his reading of Hill’s The Art of Acting can be seen as an auto-
experimental report, with his own embodied emotions as the phenomenon to be studied and 
manipulated by means of fine-tuned and refined artistic input, as well as medicine. Van Sant 
has noted that the narrative of Richardson’s Clarissa, the novel he was composing at the time 
of the letter to Hill, can be read as representing just such an experiment in sensibility.158 We 
get a reminder of Brocklesby’s vivisections, experiments performed explicitly to study 
different qualities and intensities of animal pain, when we read Burke’s section on ‘The Cries 
of Animals’: ‘Such sounds as imitate the natural inarticulate voices of men, or any animals in 
pain or danger, are capable of conveying great ideas.’159 In Burke’s Philosophical Enquiry, 
animals as well as humans were presented with refined and subtle impulses of pleasure and 
pain, in the form of different kinds of ‘exciting’ objects, in order to study their reactions as 
part of a science of sensibility, to see whether these objects give rise to the beautiful or the 
sublime.  
In acting out the powers of sentiment, the body forged ties of sociability. As Burke 
wrote, ‘we are moved as they are moved’. Shared natural responses, shared sighs or weeping, 
brought people together by the strings of sympathy. This is also the way art works: ‘It is by 
this principle [of sympathy] chiefly that poetry, painting, and other affecting arts, transfuse 
their passions from one breast to another.’160 The problem, of course, was the variety in 
responses by the public to the same impulses, possibly depending on disposition or context. 
In order to get a grip on this problem, stimuli as well as responses were codified in an 
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elaborate orchestration of artistic conventions and polite manners. Indeed, questions of a 
shared taste and manners were central preoccupations at the time.161 Du Bos formulates the 
problem well: ‘All men are subject to grieve, to weep, to laugh, and are susceptible of a great 
variety of passions, but the very same passions have different characters to distinguish 
them.’162 For Du Bos, these differences have to do with the physiology of the passions: ‘Age, 
country, temperament, sex, and profession, cause a difference between the symptoms of a 
passion produced by the same sentiment.’163 In contrast, other writers would stress the role of 
imagination and judgement in explaining the variability of affective responses. This problem, 
of universality and variability, would take centre stage in discussions on aesthetics as the 
question of taste. 
 
Sensibility and the problem of taste 
Taste is one of the central terms of eighteenth-century aesthetics. In a passage where Edmund 
Burke considers taste, we can find together all the key issues that marked what would later be 
called the field of aesthetics: ‘Whilst we consider taste merely according to its nature and 
species, we shall find its principles entirely uniform; but the degree in which these principles 
prevail, in the several individuals of mankind, is altogether as different as the principles 
themselves are similar. For sensibility and judgement, which are the qualities that compose 
what we commonly call a taste, vary exceedingly in various people.’164  
Firstly, Burke deals here with the problem of the universality versus the diversity of 
taste. On the one hand, he argues that the nature of taste, considered in general, is universal. 
For Burke, taste is based in a universal human constitution. On the other hand, different 
individuals are different instantiations of this universal human constitution. Similarly, the 
laws of refraction are everywhere the same, but different lenses have different focal points as 
well as different impurities. It is particular sensibilities and judgements that vary so much 
among various people. 
Secondly, Burke characterises taste as composed of sensibility and judgement, taking a 
particular stand in the debate about the rational or instinctive nature of taste. Burke’s solution 
is subtle, because both ‘sensibility’ and ‘judgement’ are complex terms and it is not prima 
facie clear what they mean. For now, Burke only explains that a defect in sensibility causes a 
want of taste, and that a weakness in judgement constitutes a wrong or a bad taste. The first 
do not taste much: ‘There are some men formed with feelings so blunt, with tempers so cold 
and phlegmatic, that they can hardly be said to be awake during the whole course of their 
lives. Upon such persons the most striking objects make but a faint and obscure 
impression.’165  
There are others who taste too much, due to an overextended sensibility, and they often 
lack judgement to reign it in. ‘There are others so continually in the agitation of gross and 
merely sensual pleasures, or so occupied in the low drudgery of avarice, or so heated in the 
chase of honors and distinction, that their minds, which had been used continually to the 
storms of these violent and tempestuous passions, can hardly be put in motion by the delicate 
and refined play of the imagination.’166 These men are affected, but by the wrong kind of 
impulses. They feel nothing special when struck with natural elegance or greatness, or with 
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the qualities of a work of art. They do not see beauty as beauty, and do not hold up to the real 
standard of taste, which is determined by judgement and the delicate and refined play of the 
imagination. 
Taste, according to Burke, is a ‘delicate and aerial faculty, which seems too volatile to 
endure even the chains of a definition’.167 Nevertheless, questions of taste would dominate 
eighteenth-century culture. Burke is heir to a culture of sensibility that developed the first 
prominent aesthetic theories on English soil. It was these questions, the questions of 
universality versus diversity, and of rationality versus irrationality, that occupied them in 
particular. 
Two theories in particular were overarching in early eighteenth-century aesthetics: Plato 
and Locke. Shaftesbury agreed with the Platonic claim regarding beauty and taste: namely, 
beauty exemplifies the perfect and objective good. In this view, there is no clear distinction 
between beauty and the good. That which promotes one promotes the other and that which 
hurts one hurts the other. Therefore, cultivating aesthetic taste is to intrinsically improve 
moral character. Shaftesbury most strongly defended innate elements such as ‘natural 
affection’ and the inherent goodness of human beings. On the other hand, Lockean 
empiricism dominated the intellectual discussion of early eighteenth-century England. As a 
result, later authors, such as Addison, Hutcheson and Burke, tried to build a bridge between 
the two.168  
Shaftesbury’s writings are frequently considered the earliest ‘aesthetic’ writings in 
English. Dabney Townsend calls Shaftesbury the locus classicus for the view that sentiment 
is central to beauty, morals and taste.169 Shaftesbury’s work provides the perfect locus from 
which eighteenth-century aestheticians began to consider taste. Immersed in a culture of 
sensibility, of bodily fibres and tendons, nerves and solids, that could be excited to pleasure 
and pain to different degrees, taste was a form of embodied cognition that would become 
emblematic for the time. As Denise Gigante writes, ‘By the eighteenth century, physicality 
provided access to cognitive dimensions of human experience, such as epistemology, 
morality, aesthetic pleasures and pains; the umbrella term for this new mode of embodied 
cognition was taste. Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury, was the prototype 
for the eighteenth-century Man of Taste.’170  
If Shaftesbury provides an ambitious but truly moral view of taste, Joseph Addison adds 
a more literary subjective flavour. Addison, a close reader of Shaftesbury, wanted to bring 
‘philosophy out of closets and libraries, schools and colleges, to dwell in clubs and 
assemblies, at tea-tables and in coffee houses’.171 Both writers agreed that taste and beauty 
cannot be represented systematically or rationally, but neither are they a matter of purely 
personal pleasure. Looking to solve the dichotomy between universality and diversity, they 
grounded their theories in affective human nature. Although Shaftesbury touched upon 
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affective values, his emphasis was upon value and not upon affection or the imagination. It 
was Addison who would bring the notion of imagination to the fore. ‘Addison’s imagination 
is a tertium quid’, R.L. Brett writes, ‘which attempts to make the best of both the worlds of 
reason and the feelings’.172 The imagination, related to the particular physiology and bodily 
temperament of the individual as well as to the powers of judgement, could account for the 
stability of taste and for personal idiosyncrasies.  
Precisely at the beginning of the eighteenth century the saying de gustibus non est 
disputandum becomes common in the literature. It was a poignant way to pitch the debate on 
the universality or variability of taste. On 18 June 1712, an anonymous writer with the initials 
T.B. wrote to the Spectator, ‘The strange and absurd Variety that is so apparent in Men’s 
Actions, shews plainly they can never proceed immediately from Reason; so pure a Fountain 
emits no such troubled Waters: They must necessarily arise from the Passions, which are to 
the Mind as the Winds to a Ship’.173 The traditional view of taste responded to this relativist 
challenge by reasserting the importance of following Neo-classical rules in order to 
determine one’s likes or dislikes concerning taste. If one follows these rules rigorously, 
understanding these rules becomes more important than experience or the opinion of others. 
These rules were often encoded in stylistic handbooks and a canon of experts. Decorum was 
one such rule that most authors of the seventeenth century obeyed. The second road, the one 
that Shaftesbury and Addison propose, would be to place into question the Neo-classicist 
view by proposing a new understanding of taste as a harmony between sense and reason.  
Addison thought that the best way to relate these two disparate parts of man is by means 
of the imagination. The question to confront here is whether one’s own imagination is key or 
whether the imagination of others also plays a role. For example, an art lover visits a museum 
and is told by an imaginative expert that this new piece of art is the new fashion and that 
everyone should love it. In this example, the spectator of the artwork, without basing an 
opinion of the artwork on her individual experience, trusts the expert’s judgement. The art 
lover then takes the word of the expert against her own imagination or sense-based 
apprehension of the work. On the other hand, could one person disagree with the majority in 
determining the quality of an artwork, solely based on the appeal it makes on his or her 
imagination? If one’s own imagination is all there is to the question of taste, one might after 
all regress in a de gustibus non est disputandum solipsism. If interpreted in this way, the 
imagination includes all the ambiguities that it was meant to resolve. 
Theories of the imagination stressed the importance of individual experience against the 
rigidity of Neo-classical rule-following. In the years that the Spectator was published, a man 
of taste was a synonym for a polite man. Because this could easily be regarded as someone 
who followed the rules determined by polite manners and society, Addison contributed to this 
meaning a further requirement. ‘Polite’ should go beyond the societal sense, but it also refers 
to one’s personal sensibility, even to a ‘Faculty of the Soul’. Like the passions or the 
sentiments, the culture of imagination and taste was not only socially shared, but also an 
embodied part of the person. Nevertheless, the imagination was also a faculty of sociability. 
The imagination was socialised in education and it connected people through imitation and 
sympathy. Through the imagination, it was possible to escape a solipsistic and relativistic 
notion of taste. Therefore, it was possible ‘that music, architecture, and painting, as well as 
poetry and oratory, are to deduce their laws and rules from the general sense and taste of 
mankind’,174 as Addison wrote in an early paper of his Spectator.  
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As already seen, Francis Hutcheson’s notion of an ‘internal sense’ was another attempt 
to combine themes from Shaftesbury and Locke and to find a solution for the problem of 
universality and diversity. For Hutcheson, morality and aesthetics are closely intertwined, 
because both beauty and virtue cause a pleasurable experience in the beholder, and this 
pleasure is an indication of their identity. Hutcheson writes, ‘Our gentlemen of good taste can 
tell us of a great many senses, tastes, and relishes for beauty, harmony, imitation in painting 
and poetry; and may not we find too in mankind a relish for a beauty in characters, in 
manners?’175 In his An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1725), 
Hutcheson aims to prove ‘that there is some sense of beauty natural to men; that we find as 
great an agreement of men in their relishes of forms, as in their external senses which all 
agree to be natural; and that pleasure or pain, delight or aversion, are naturally join’d to their 
Perceptions’.176 This natural sense is part of human constitution, placed in us according to an 
overall divine plan that directs us to the good, and this guarantees the universality of morality 
as well as of aesthetics.  
Hutcheson uses wine as an example to defend the view that all taste begins in sensing. 
The problem that arises is that not everyone likes wine and that tastes can change. When one 
is younger, one does not like wine, but when one is older, some like wine, and some do not. 
Hutcheson writes, ‘The simple ideas raised in different persons by the same object, are 
probably some way different, when they disagree in their approbation or dislike; and in the 
same person, when his fancy at one time differs from what it was at another’.177 Hutcheson 
calls some of these differences ‘accidental’, for example, when someone has an aversion to 
wine due to the fact that they have first tried wine ‘in an emetic preparation’ when they were 
ill,178 or when the perceptual situations differ such as when ‘a warm Hand shall feel that 
Water cold, which a cold hand shall feel warm’.179 Because the imagination processes the 
sense impressions, a variation in someone’s fancy might be considered similar to a different 
perceptual situation: the simple ideas that enter the mind will have changed too.  
Furthermore, Hutcheson sees association as responsible for variations in judgements of 
beauty and taste. We experience many perceptions at the same time, and these perceptions 
remain linked together. Because of those associations, some things seem pleasant that would 
not be so in themselves and vice versa. This also implies that one’s taste can be corrected and 
educated. Associations can change, and they can be manipulated as part of education. 
Someone who drunk wine first in an emetic preparation, and associated it with sickness and 
foul tasting medical substances, will have to drink wine in different contexts in order to come 
to appreciate it. He will disregard the unpleasantness that came by association, and will 
recognise the inherent pleasantness of the object itself. Therefore, educated sentiments will 
come to approach more nearly to true judgements of beauty and virtue. 
 
Uniformity, variety and beauty 
Variety and uniformity were not only topics of discussion in regard with aesthetic reception 
and taste, but they were also central to the consideration of aesthetic objects and the 
definitions of the beautiful. Hutcheson’s naturalistic approach assumes that there are 
properties of objects that affect our ‘internal sense’ in a natural way. These properties 
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stimulate ideas that we experience as beauty, virtue or their contraries. So Hutcheson could 
look for particular instances that uniformly produce particular sentiments of pleasure. He 
proposed ‘uniformity amidst variety’ as the property that produces the feeling of beauty in 
anyone with a normal sense of beauty. Beauty is nothing other than such sentiments caused 
by objects that satisfy specific empirical conditions such as the compound ratio of uniformity 
and diversity. From these more general reflections one could then derive specific maxims that 
could be used by artists. 
William Hogarth, an entrepreneurial practicing artist and engraver who appealed 
especially to a popular audience, strongly contradicted Hutcheson’s ideas. In his Analysis of 
Beauty, Written with a View of Fixing the Fluctuating Ideas of Taste (1753), he explains the 
principles that, according to him, lie behind the production of beautiful objects. Hutcheson 
only reinforced the classical ideals in adopting the traditional characteristics of uniformity, 
harmony and variety. Hogarth’s approach was more empirical and he was more sensitive to 
modern tastes. Against Hutcheson’s uniformity, he extolled variety, intricacy and variation. 
Hogarth’s rule-based, didactic and practical approach resulted, however, in a rather 
reductionist – and often ridiculed – characterisation of beauty as the product of a sensuous 
line that curves smoothly in an S-shaped form. Hogarth made the symbol of the S-shaped line 
even into a motto and a hieroglyph adorning the frontispiece of his work: ‘In the year 1745, 
[I] published a frontispiece to my engraved works, in which I drew a serpentine line lying on 
a painter’s palet, with these words under it, THE LINE OF BEAUTY. The bait soon took; and no 
Egyptian hieroglyphic ever amused more than it did for a time, painters and sculptors came to 
me to know the meaning of it.’180 
Hogarth accepts Hutcheson’s sense-based psychology and the pleasure-pain model, and 
this naturalism also assumes a fixed, normal aesthetic response to objects. His understanding 
of the sensory response to beauty is very different from that of Hutcheson, however. As 
Richardson explains, ‘In the moral-sense paradigm, the perception of uniformity provides 
man with an ideal state of happiness described in terms of equilibrium and quietude. [...] 
With uniformity, humans experience an ideal equilibrium between mutually mellowing 
“facility and exertion”. In contrast, Hogarth’s appeal to variation corresponded to an ideal of 
activity and stimulation. “The active mind is ever bent to be employ’d. Pursuing is the 
business of our lives; and even abstracted from any other view gives pleasure. Every arising 
difficulty, that for a while attends and interrupts the pursuit, gives a sort of spring to the 
mind, enhances the pleasure, and makes what would else be toil and labour, become sport 
and recreation.”’181  
Burke would bring together these two strands of thought with his distinction between the 
beautiful and the sublime. The beautiful, for Burke, is what relaxes, quiets and softens. Like 
Hogarth, he is much more positive about the exerting and stimulating influences of what he 
calls the sublime. Burke does not agree, however, with the qualities of the objects of which 
Hutcheson or Hogarth suppose that they have these effects. Much of the Philosophical 
Enquiry is spent in arguing against Hutcheson and the classical characteristics of beauty. In 
part 3, for instance, large sections are devoted to arguing that proportion, fitness, perfection 
are not the cause of beauty. Playing out Hogarth against Hutcheson, he writes: ‘It gives me 
no small pleasure to find that I can strengthen my theory in this point by the opinion of the 
very ingenious Mr. Hogarth, whose idea of the line of beauty I take in general to be 
extremely just.’182  
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At the same time, however, he criticises Hogarth: ‘But the idea of variation, without 
attending so accurately to the manner of the variation, has led him to consider angular figures 
as beautiful; these figures, it is true, vary greatly, yet they vary in a sudden and broken 
manner, and I do not find any natural object which is angular, and at the same time 
beautiful.’183 According to Burke, smallness, smoothness, gradual variation and delicacy are 
among the causes of beauty. These are aptly in contrast with the qualities of the sublime, such 
as terror, obscurity, power, vastness, infinity, difficulty. Both Burke and Hogarth, self-made 
entrepreneurial men, celebrate an active life with as highest pleasures the effort of 
overcoming difficulties. By celebrating tension, difficulty and power, they react against the 
quietist classical notion of equilibrium, and against contemplative philosophers as well as the 
languid gentry.184  
In his youth, Burke had accepted Hutcheson’s characteristic example of beauty as 
uniformity, the Newtonian laws of gravity, as paradigmatic.185 Hogarth rejected the natural 
philosophers’ concept of universal beauty as the harmony and order of things. In contrast, he 
was fascinated by ‘Natures more superficial beautys, of sportiveness, and Fancy’.186 The new 
natural philosophy treated nature as governed by immutable laws, a view first put forward by 
Descartes and developed by Newton. The older view did not think that nature followed fixed 
laws. Nature usually followed a general course, but there were many exceptions. Nature was 
often personified as a whimsical woman who was playful and made jokes. This led to the 
generation of monsters, wonders and other preternatural phenomena. As Lorraine Daston and 
Katharine Park have argued, the seventeenth century was fascinated by these wonders. 
Hogarth referred with nostalgia to this older concept of nature, in which not everything was 
the result of uniform immutable laws.187 The older concept allowed for a perspective he 
preferred, a perspective that was open to wonders, the exceptional and inexplicable.188 Burke 
did not have an aesthetic admiration for the new sciences, like Hutcheson, but he tried to 
develop a science of aesthetics, based on naturalistic premises. Both Hutcheson and 
Hogarth’s theories were grounded in a sense-based psychology, but they would not develop a 
full-fledged science of aesthetics, detailing all the modes of sensibility behind the 
experiences of the beautiful and the sublime, as Burke would do and Kant after him. This 
science was part of the ‘science of man’ project of the Scottish Enlightenment, and did accept 
the Cartesian and Newtonian idea of uniformity and immutable laws. Burke would apply this 
central tenet of the new natural philosophy in the idea of the uniformity of man and in a 
mechanistic law-like explanation of the beautiful and the sublime.  
Beauty, according to Burke, is not primarily a matter of reason. It was not ‘implanted in 
our natures [...] for necessary and useful purposes,’ as Hogarth had claimed.189 Nor was it the 
result of an ‘internal sense’. For Burke, the beautiful is primarily, but not solely, the result of 
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a mechanical operation: ‘Beauty is, for the greater part, some quality in bodies acting 
mechanically upon the human mind by the intervention of the senses.’190 In this way, he 
places the origin of the idea of the beautiful in the physical sensibility of the body, which is 
determined by mechanical laws. Burke proposes an empirical approach to discover the 
qualities that make an object beautiful for us: ‘We ought, therefore, to consider attentively in 
what manner those sensible qualities are disposed, in such things as by experience we find 
beautiful, or which excite in us the passion of love, or some correspondent affection’.191 As a 
result of this inquiry, Burke can give a definition of beauty that is grounded in physiological 
reactions. ‘Our position will, I conceive, appear confirmed beyond any reasonable doubt, if 
we can show that such things as we have already observed to be the genuine constituents of 
beauty have each of them, separately taken, a natural tendency to relax the fibres.’192 For 
Burke, the beautiful is grounded in what relaxes the bodily nerves and fibres.  
 
Hume, Burke and the standard of taste 
David Hume was a close reader of Shaftesbury, Addison, Du Bos, Hutcheson and Hogarth.193 
He was also directly engaged with Burke, and as Perinetti shows in chapter 14 of this 
volume, Burke’s introduction on taste and Hume’s essay on taste were part of a specific 
polemic. On the question of taste, both Hume and Burke support a view of taste that is based 
on an anthropological universality, the precondition for the possibility of a ‘science of man’, 
and that is fundamentally based in pleasure. They differ, however, on how to justify the 
‘standard of taste’. The ‘standard of taste’ is a new problem that came to the fore with 
Hume’s writings. Again, the issue is the universality versus the diversity of taste. Eighteenth-
century writers argued for the universality of taste but had difficulties with coming to grips 
with the perceived varieties. Earlier writers such as Shaftesbury, Addison or Hutcheson paid 
little attention to possible disagreements between different judgements of taste, and did not 
offer a coherent solution to resolve them. Hume put the problem of agreement and 
disagreement – the problem of a standard of taste – at the centre of his aesthetics. As Dabney 
Townsend writes: this problem of a standard, ‘why one must have some standard to settle 
disputes and how such a standard can be made consistent with the empirical sentimentalism 
at the heart of Hume’s epistemology’, is central to Hume’s project.194  
The quandary that Hume faces is the following: if there is a standard of taste that is 
universal, the art lover must accept the view of the art expert (or critic) and thus risk not 
having the pleasure that normally comes with aesthetic appreciation. If we put aesthetic 
pleasure as the basic constituent of taste, we risk arguing with others about the pleasure they 
feel, without any hope for a resolution. These two requirements are at the basis of a divorce 
between pleasure and universality in Hume’s standard of taste. This bifurcation is a poignant 
reformulation of the older problem of judgement versus affect, which had troubled the 
eighteenth-century aestheticians for decades. Perinetti’s contribution to this volume further 
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elucidates this relation between judgement and sentiment and shows its centrality to the 
discussion between Hume and Burke. 
Burke wrote his ‘Introduction on Taste’, added to the second edition of his Philosophical 
Enquiry (1759), as a response to Hume. In this introduction, he defined ‘Taste’ as: ‘that 
faculty, or those faculties of the mind which are affected with, or which form a judgement of 
the works of imagination and the elegant arts’.195 He was troubled by critics of his day 
writing treatises on taste with ‘no fixed principles’.196 The current definition of taste, in his 
day, was equivalent to ‘caprice’ and ‘whims and fancies’.197 The underlying claim that Burke 
makes is to a certain ‘standard both of reason and Taste [that is] the same in all human 
creatures’.198 According to Burke, taste, at its foundation, involves three distinct faculties: 
 
Taste, in its most general acceptation, is not a simple idea, but is partly made up of a perception of 
the primary pleasures of sense, of the secondary pleasures of the imagination, and of the 
conclusions of the reasoning faculty, concerning the various relations of these, and concerning the 
human passions, manners and actions.199  
 
These three primary ‘natural powers’ of the human being ‘that are conversant about external 
objects’ are the fundamental anthropological bases of any philosophical endeavour at all. 
Any one of these faculties without the other cannot fulfil the necessary prerequisites of a 
standard of taste. From this, it becomes clear that Burke cannot be treated as a reductive 
sensationalist with respect to taste. His views are subtler and should be characterised as a 
sentiment based view of human nature that fundamentally includes personal, social and 
judgemental aspects. Taste is not only a sense, a product of the imagination or a rational 
judgement. This is the crucial point in Burke’s ‘logic’ of taste. There must be three distinct 
‘moments’: sense, imagination and judgement. All three of these are required in order for the 
complex formulation and origin of taste to be philosophically understood. 
When Burke first discusses sense perception, he relates it to the most simple ideas (i.e. 
those that cannot be based on anything else) of pleasure and pain, similar to what Locke had 
done in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Burke writes the following in relation 
to the sense of taste, ‘All men are agreed to call vinegar sour, honey sweet, and aloes 
bitter…They all concur in calling sweetness pleasant, and sourness and bitterness 
unpleasant’.200 Whereas the taste of vinegar or honey may be qualitatively better, there is no 
argument over the bitterness or sweetness of the taste. Even among those of different cultures 
or races, there should be, says Burke, an agreement over the fact that something is sweet or 
something is bitter. The more difficult claim is relating bitterness or sweetness to pleasure or 
pain. He continues: ‘[F]or as the senses are the great originals of all our ideas, and 
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consequently of all our pleasures, if they are not uncertain and arbitrary, the whole ground-
work of Taste is common to all, and therefore there is a sufficient foundation for a conclusive 
reasoning on these matters’.201  
Although this anthropology beginning with sense perception may seem like an a priori 
view placed onto taste, in discussing whether taste can be disputed, Burke grounds each 
judgement in a kind of naturalism: ‘So that when it is said, Taste cannot be disputed, it can 
only mean, that no one can strictly answer what pleasure or pain some particular man may 
find from the Taste of some particular thing. This indeed cannot be disputed; but we may 
dispute, and with sufficient clearness too, concerning the things which are naturally pleasing 
or disagreeable to the sense’.202 What is naturally pleasing or disagreeable to the senses for 
Burke? In discussing the sense of sight, he writes, ‘Light is more pleasing than darkness’. 
Burke writes further, ‘sight is not near so complicated, and confused, and altered by 
unnatural habits and associations, as the pleasures of Taste are’.203 Whereas universality for 
Hume may be at the expense of basic pleasure or displeasure of the object, for Burke, it is the 
reverse. Since there is an emphasis on the origin of taste in an internal sense-based reaction, 
whether or not the external object is the same or not, the universality lies in the natural 
human response to the beautiful (or sublime) object. This is compounded when Burke says, 
‘when we talk of any peculiar or acquired relish, then we must know the habits, the 
prejudices, or the distempers of this particular man, and we must draw our conclusion from 
those’.204 Unlike Hume, for Burke, it is not a requirement to rid oneself of prejudices and 
look to the external critic, but to examine and be familiar with one’s own habits and 
prejudices (in relation to others’) in making a judgement of taste. If one were to ever make a 
judgement without regard to some sense-based pleasure in oneself, then this judgement 
would be fundamentally erroneous. 
When Burke provides us with examples, he attempts to convince us that, ‘the pleasure of 
all the senses, of the sight, and even of the Taste, that most ambiguous of the senses, is the 
same in all, high and low, learned and unlearned’.205 Thus, according to Burke, we are all 
naturally inclined to find pleasure or displeasure in certain objects by means of our senses. 
The experts do not decide for us what we should naturally like or not. Although there would 
be clear problems with this view of taste if it were based on sense impressions alone, Burke’s 
point here is that humans have a natural inclination, although unnatural examples may still 
exist. 
After arguing for this view of sense perception, Burke constructs a theory of the 
imagination. Locke and Addison provided the impetus for Burke’s view of sense perception, 
and its link to pleasure and pain, Burke also agreed with Locke and Addison when he says 
that the imagination is ‘incapable of producing any thing absolutely new’.206 The imagination 
is thus a mimetic faculty that ‘can only vary the disposition of those ideas which it has 
received from the senses’. Most importantly for Burke, it ‘is the most extensive province of 
pleasure and pain’. Tying the senses to the passions, the imagination represents the senses 
and pleases or displeases ‘with the images from the same principle on which the sense is 
pleased or displeased with the realities’. Just as all humans should agree with regard to what 
pleases the senses, it is the same with the imagination. However, there is a difference with 
regard to the imagination: in addition to the pain or pleasure ‘arising from the properties of 
the natural object, a pleasure is perceived from the resemblance, which the imitation has to 
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the original’.207 Fundamentally, for Burke, the difference between tastes may be reduced to 
this basic ‘non-identical’ nature between the original and the imitation. 
The imagination’s ‘sort of creative power’, in Burke’s words, is compared to ‘wit’ and 
this faculty’s ability to trace resemblances. There is a fundamental difference between wit 
and judgement. Whereas both have ‘no material distinction’, wit (or imagination) has the 
power of comparing two objects that are alike, ‘tracing resemblances’ between them, but 
judgement finds differences. Burke interprets this distinction as follows:  
 
When two distinct objects are unlike to each other, it is only what we expect; things are in their 
common way; and therefore they make no impression on the imagination: but when two distinct 
objects have a resemblance, we are struck, we attend to them, and we are pleased. The mind of 
man has naturally a far greater alacrity and satisfaction in tracing resemblances than in searching 
for differences; because by making resemblances we produce new images, we unite, we create, we 
enlarge our stock.208  
 
Burke explains the differences between human tastes in the following way:  
 
So far then as Taste belongs to the imagination, its principle is the same in all men; there is no 
difference in the manner of their being affected, nor in the causes of the affection; but in the 
degree there is a difference, which arises from two causes principally; either from a greater degree 
of natural sensibility, or from a closer and longer attention to the object.209 
 
What Burke explains here, consistent with his empirical method, is that although we have 
natural dispositions to sense objects in a certain way (i.e. light is pleasing, marble is smooth), 
there are degrees to these dispositions. In relation to these differing degrees of natural 
sensibility, Burke describes differences among human beings thus: 
 
If we differ in opinion about two quantities we can have recourse to a common measure, which 
may decide the question with the utmost exactness; and this I take it is what gives mathematical 
knowledge a greater certainty than any other. But in things whose excess is not judged by greater 
or smaller, as smoothness and roughness, hardness and softness, darkness and light, the shades of 
colours, all these are very easily distinguished when the difference is in any way considerable, but 
not when it is minute, for want of some common measures which perhaps may never come to be 
discovered. In these nice cases, supposing the acuteness of the sense equal, the greater attention 
and habit in such things will have the advantage.210 
 
In these latter differences, the only way to discern how our natural sensibility works is to pay 
greater attention to the object and thus develop our tastes further. This corresponds to 
Hume’s famous example of Sancho’s kinsmen in his 1742 essay, ‘Of the Delicacy of Taste 
and Passion’.211 The goal of delicacy appears to be able to have such a refined taste in, for 
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example, wine that one could taste the leather or the metal in the wine. However, Burke’s 
response to this would be that, even if we could taste the leather and metal, this would not 
change the pleasure of drinking wine. It is the same with painting or architecture. By 
knowing the date, dimensions or the meaning of the painting or building need not necessarily 
add or subtract the pleasure giving possibility of the object unless, by raising comparisons 
(not differences) with the imagination, the pleasure is somehow furthered. But why should 
we then even give any ‘closer and longer attention to the object’ if all that matters is the 
immediate sense-based apprehension of an object (along with the ‘associative’ pleasures of 
the imagination)? It seems that given time and effort on our parts, we may be able to change 
these differences among human tastes if we were all to spend our lives discussing and 
observing (or listening, tasting, etc.) the same objects, and this is Hume’s point with regard to 
delicacy and greater practice. Given that knowledge and truth are also universal, it is in 
principle possible, given enough time and education, to align different people’s tastes. But, 
given different times and cultures, this ideal is in practice absolutely impossible.  
The third requirement of taste in Burke is judgement. This is the only standard to 
possibly mediate between senses and the imagination, and it is indeed where some sort of 
rationality enters into Burke’s discussion of taste. In clarifying Burke’s point about 
judgement, one should see that reasons’ power is more of a slave to the imagination and the 
senses than in Hume’s standard of taste. Nevertheless, judgement is fundamentally built upon 
experience as in Locke. Judgement is the ability to make distinctions, as when Burke writes, 
‘it is for the most part in our skill in manners, and in the observances of time and place, and 
of decency in general, which is only to be learned in those schools to which Horace 
recommends us, that what is called Taste by way of distinction, consists; and which is in 
reality no other than a more refined judgement’.212 Judgement is thus the refinement of what 
we learn from the senses and imagination, recognising the power they have over us, and 
acting accordingly. ‘The cause of a wrong Taste is a defect of judgment’213, Burke pointedly 
writes, emphasising the fact that although all are affected in the same way at the first two 
levels (i.e. senses and imagination), differences among human beings are centred at this third 
level of judgement. We do dispute over tastes here, whereas we do not dispute over affect. 
Nevertheless, Burke thinks, not unlike Hume, the more delicate and refined the workings of 
sympathy are on the imagination, the better judgement we will have. ‘Ignorance, inattention, 
prejudice, rashness, levity, obstinacy’ – these are the passions which inhibit judgement. They 
‘are the causes [that] produce different opinions upon every thing which is an object of the 
understanding’. Burke describes how judgement is at its weakest ‘in the morning of our 
days’, that is, when we are young. Without enough experience, we cannot judge artworks 
well. A refined judge, then, is able to fully recognise the ‘excellence and force of a 
composition’ and its ‘effect on the minds’ of those around one. Burke puts this more 
powerfully when he writes,  
 
where disposition, where decorum, where congruity are concerned, in short wherever the best 
Taste differs from the worst, I am convinced that the understanding operates and nothing else; and 
its operation is in reality far from being always sudden, or when it is sudden, it is often far from 
being right. It is known that Taste (whatever it is) is improved exactly as we improve our 
judgment, by extending our knowledge, by a steady attention to our object, and by frequent 
exercise.214  
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For Burke, judgement does not require an external ‘critic’ or rule-based (i.e. 
Neoclassical) aesthetics, but it is nevertheless socially constructed. Furthermore, this standard 
is not separate from the judgement or the imagination, nor is it a species of instinct. This is an 
implicit critique of Hutcheson and Du Bos whose internal sense worked mechanically like an 
instinct. As we have seen, Hutcheson’s view basically amounted to a purely naturalistic 
expression of sense. There was no choice or will involved. One either likes or dislikes 
something based on a human mechanism. However, a judgement of taste for Burke, though 
based on sensible qualities of an object as well as the imagination, is further built upon the 
passionate nature of the human being, which requires ‘acuteness’ or ‘delicacy’. Burke 
mentions in particular the passions of ‘love, grief, fear, anger, and joy’ that have affected 
every mind. Educated sensibility is a keyword for what Burke promotes here, or, as he states 
even stronger, ‘Taste…is in reality no other than a more refined judgement’. Judgement and 
reason are necessary for the ‘common measure’, namely, a standard of taste. This is precisely 
where the internal anthropological nature of the human being is tied to the social world 
outside. Burke writes, 
 
But as many of the works of imagination are not confined to the representation of sensible objects, 
nor to efforts upon the passions, but extend themselves to the manners, the characters, the actions, 
and designs of men, their relations, their virtues and vices, they come with the province of 
judgement, which is improved by attention and by the habit of reasoning. All these make a very 
considerable part of what are considered as the objects of Taste; and Horace sends us to the 
schools of philosophy and the world for our instruction in them.215 
 
Here, Burke finds some resonance with Shaftesbury. Taste is thus not entirely divorced from 
the social or the moral. What he means by judgement is best articulated when he concludes 
that what is called ‘taste’ in its most general acceptation, is not a simple idea, but is partly 
composed by looking into one’s own breasts and examining one’s own passions and thoughts 
in relation to those of others.  
Burke presents a complex, three-tiered, theory of taste, in which the interplay between 
sense, imagination and judgement will determine the outcome. The potential universality of 
taste is grounded in the universality of the causal structure of man’s sense perceptions, but 
the other levels introduce diversity in taste, because of differences in attention, experience 
and knowledge. Aligning these latter differences, by educating people’s sensibility, for 
instance, will bring their taste closer together, but an ultimate convergence seems 
unrealisable. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this essay, we have shown that Edmund Burke’s Philosophical Enquiry fitted squarely in 
the culture of sensibility. Burke drew on many developments in the new physiology, moral 
philosophy and aesthetics of sensibility. In each of these fields, Burke made his own 
significant contribution with his theory of the origins of our ideas of beauty and the sublime. 
The impact on aesthetics of Burke’s reconceptualisation of the sublime in terms of a mixture 
of pleasure and pain is well known. That Burke’s notion contributed to a maximalist view of 
tension, labour and effort in the sciences is only recently being explored. As we have shown, 
Burke’s analysis of a mixture of pleasure and pain, responsible for a balance between 
attraction and repulsion, was also important for Burke’s views on moral action. These three 
aspects, the confluence of science (truth), morals (goodness) and aesthetics (beauty), are at 
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the core of the Enlightenment notion of sensibility, nevertheless continuing a Platonic 
enquiry. This, together with Burke’s detailed experiential descriptions of a physiology of 
sensibility and his efforts to take these as a foundation for his ideas in aesthetics and moral 
philosophy as part of a ‘science of man’, warrant us to take the ‘science of sensibility’ as a 
framework for interpreting the Philosophical Enquiry.  
In the early Enlightenment, science and sensibility were closely intertwined. 
Philosophers not only developed scientific and naturalising approaches towards moral and 
aesthetic subjects. Because all knowledge arose from physical sensation caused by a 
stimulus, and the accompanying emotions, the sciences themselves became sentimental and 
moralised. As Jessica Riskin has shown, in the 1750s, philosophers and naturalists such as 
Buffon, Diderot and Condillac recommended following one’s instincts as well as emotional 
responses as the appropriate way to pursue scientific inquiry.216 Natural historians urged to 
explore the links between taste and reason, connoisseurship and utility, science and 
sensibility.217 Philosophers not only developed a naturalist theory of aesthetics, but also an 
aesthetic view of nature, stressing the importance of inner feeling, taste and sensibility in the 
sciences.218 The science of sensibility and sentimental or sensibilious science were two sides 
of the same coin. This indicates that there was no uni-directional influence of physiology and 
medicine on Burke’s Philosophical Enquiry, but that the Enquiry also had an impact on the 
various sciences. Studying the reception of the Enquiry in various cultural domains is only 
partly covered in this book, but it is good to remind oneself of the pervasiveness of the 
culture of sensibility, which even penetrated the hardest sciences such as physics and 
chemistry.219 
Science as well as sensibility was central to many of Edmund Burke’s interests and 
pursuits, from his early acquaintance with the Nugents until the end of his career as a 
political icon and rhetorician. The contributions in Part 1 of this book show how Burke was 
inspired by Locke’s philosophy, Newton’s methodology, and providential natural theology. 
He was interested in medicine and environmental philosophy and paid close attention to the 
sensibilities of the different senses. From this, he built his own philosophy of aesthesis, a true 
‘science of sensibility’. For Burke, sensibility was not only a key factor in aesthetics. For 
thinkers of the early Enlightenment, sensibility lay also at the basis of sociability and new 
conceptions of manners and taste. In Part 2 and 3, it is shown that Burke intertwined the 
social and the aesthetic in such a way as to propound an aesthetic sociability, a social theory 
of aesthetics as well as a ‘providential sociability’.220 Sympathy, or a reciprocal sensibility, 
was the prime social bond that God placed in human beings in order to relate to each other. 
Unlike Hobbes or Mandeville’s more ‘atomistic’ theory of human beings, sympathy causes 
people to exchange emotions and react in unison. But it was especially the power of words, 
exercised to perfection in Burke’s own practice as a rhetorician, which moved the affects of 
the human most strongly. For Burke, words were stronger than visual experiences. The 
sounds of words had a powerful bodily impact, affecting one’s sensibility to the core. But this 
sensibility had to be socialised, and in order to become a ‘man of taste’, characterised by 
delicacy and good manners, sensibility had to be guided by judgement.  
This brings us back to the two guiding threads of this introductory essay: the problem of 
universality versus variety and the problem of (to use Austen’s terms) ‘sense’ versus 
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‘sensibility’. These are problems inherent to any science of sensibility. Burke, using the 
conceptual tools handed to him by his contemporaries, tried to construct his own particular 
solution. As a result, we have the Philosophical Enquiry, a brilliant text with – maybe as its 
most considerable contribution – its reformulation of beauty in the light of a formulation of 
the philosophical as much as physiological notion of the sublime.  
 
